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ABSTRACT 
This thesis proposes a multi approach to financial market integration through the 
perspective of investors and their portfolios. Financial integration has been one of the 
main goals of the European community after the Treaty of Rome. Financial market 
integration is a critical aspect of financial integration. Therefore, it is important to assess 
how the level of financial market integration has evolved in recent years. 
Our research aims to investigate the behavior of investment funds in order to better 
understand the level and drivers of financial market integration in Europe and how it 
evolved through time in recent years since the euro introduction.  
We start by proposing a new return-based approach to measure the degree of 
financial market integration. We examine the geographic investment style of equity 
investment funds that invested in the euro area over time. Specifically, we use a 
methodology based on the style analysis model proposed by Sharpe (1992) to measure 
the exposure of funds to euro and non-euro equity market benchmarks over time.  
We also analyze the evolution of the allocation strategy of European equity 
investment funds, by examining their portfolio holdings. Considering the home (and euro) 
bias as proxy of financial market integration, we propose a model that accounts for the 
main drivers of the allocation bias over time and across funds. Finally, we investigate 
cross-border corporate ownership of European equity investment funds. 
Results support the evidence reported by previous studies that financial market 
integration improved after the euro introduction followed by a partial setback just after 
the outbreak of the last financial crisis. Our results suggest a lower degree of integration 
in European equity markets outside the euro area. Yet the evidence also supports different 
levels of integration within the euro area. The results hold both for the return-based and 
the holdings-based approaches.  
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RESUMO 
Esta tese propõe uma abordagem multi-metodológica à integração dos mercados 
financeiros através da perspetiva dos investidores e das suas carteiras. A integração 
financeira tem sido um dos principais objetivos da comunidade Europeia após o Tratado 
de Roma. A integração dos mercados financeiros é um aspeto crítico da integração 
financeira. Assim, é importante aferir como tem evoluído o nível de integração dos 
mercados financeiros nos últimos anos. 
A nossa investigação visa o comportamento dos fundos de investimento com o 
propósito de melhor perceber o nível e os determinantes da integração dos mercados 
financeiros na Europa e como esta tem evoluído, nos últimos anos, após a introdução do 
euro.  
Iniciamos propondo uma nova abordagem com um modelo de retornos que mede 
o grau de integração dos mercados financeiros. Analisamos o estilo de investimento 
geográfico de fundos de investimentos em ações que investem na área euro ao longo do 
tempo. Em concreto, seguimos uma metodologia baseada no modelo de análise de estudo 
estilo proposta por Sharpe (1992) para medir a exposição dos fundos a benchmarks de 
ações euro e não euro ao longo do tempo. 
Adicionalmente, analisamos a evolução da estratégia de alocação de fundos de 
investimento europeus de ações, através das suas carteiras. Considerando o enviesamento 
doméstico (e euro) como proxy da integração dos mercados financeiros, propomos um 
modelo que considera os principais determinantes dos enviesamentos e da alocação 
através do tempo e fundos. Por último, investigamos a detenção transfronteiriça de fundos 
de investimento europeus em ações.  
Os resultados suportam a evidência, já reportada pelos estudos anteriores, de que 
a integração dos mercados financeiros melhorou após a introdução do euro, seguido por 
um revés parcial logo após a eclosão da última crise financeira. Os nossos resultados 
sugerem um menor nível de integração financeira nos mercados acionistas externos à área 
euro. Contudo, a evidência também sustenta a existência de níveis distintos de integração 
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dentro da área euro. Os resultados são válidos tanto para a abordagem de retornos como 
para a abordagem de detenção.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of financial market 
integration in Europe. To understand the dynamics of financial market integration in 
recent times, we study the behavior European equity investment funds by examining their 
portfolio returns and their domestic and cross-border holdings and corporate ownership 
preferences. 
This chapter introduces the topic of our research. Section 1.1 presents the 
motivation and importance of the topic and document the behavior of cross-border flows 
over the period 2001-2017. Section 1.2 provides a brief but comprehensive review of the 
related literature. We summon up the seminal studies, and the approaches proposed 
therein to measure financial market integration, from an asset pricing or an holdings’ 
perspective. In particular, we review the studies on home bias. Section 1.3 presents the 
purpose and the contribution of the research and an overview of our results. 
 
1.1 Motivation and Importance 
Economic and financial integration is one of the policy targets underlying the 
construction of the European project. The first step was taken in 1957 with the Treaty of 
Rome which established the creation of the common market as a central objective, only 
possible through the elimination of the barriers to capital movements (Wojcik, 2002).   
Financial integration is critical for the future of European countries and regions: 
increasing capital flows across countries lead to higher cross-border holdings of financial 
assets broadening the investor base and therefore improving international risk sharing. At 
the same time, international capital flows raise accounting, disclosure, and corporate 
governance standards. Ultimately, financial integration enhances the efficiency of the 
financial system in capital allocation and therefore economic growth (Babecky et al., 
2013, Wojcik, 2002). Notwithstanding, some authors provide evidence of negative 
impacts of the increase in financial integration, particularly in times of financial instability 
  
2 
 
(Mendoza et al., 2009, Babecky et al., 2013). The intensification process of globalization 
increases the interconnection between markets, increasing the sensitivity of domestic 
markets to global shocks, financial crises are no longer restricted to regional borders and 
contagion across markets may lead to greater financial instability. Furthermore, there 
could be insufficient access to funding due to capital concentration, resulting in 
inappropriate allocation of capital (Babecky et al., 2013).    
Despite all the acknowledged benefits and importance given to capital market 
integration, several warnings have been raised in Europe. The first was the report that has 
emerged from the Committee of Wise Men, set up by the European Commission in the 
beginning of 2001, commonly known as Lamfalussy report (Wojcik, 2002). The report 
essentially called for more reforms at a regulatory basis but the lack of consensus about 
the level of integration that had been reached was evident. In part, this could be justified 
by the fact that, in practice and in the literature, there are very different ways to define 
and measure financial market integration.  
Since the establishment of the euro area, several studies have assessed the impact 
of the monetary union on the integration of the capital markets. Examples are Fratzscher 
(2002), Guiso et al. (2004), Kim et al. (2006), Bartram et al. (2007), Cappiello et al. 
(2010), De Santis (2010) and Haselmann and Herwartz (2010). Regardless of the 
approach and measure used to proxy financial market integration, the evidence is rather 
consensual and suggests a positive impact of the introduction of the euro. Along with the 
euro introduction, the removal of formal restrictions to capital flows and the creation of 
common trading platforms and market infrastructures boosted liquidity and facilitated the 
financial integration process and cross-border portfolio flows (Adam et al., 2002, De 
Santis and Gérard, 2009). Yet, all these factors seem to produce portfolio allocations 
biased in favor of euro assets. To fully benefit from international diversification, investors 
would rather increase their holdings in non-domestic euro area assets (De Santis and 
Gérard, 2009, Vermeulen, 2013, Baele et al., 2004). Grossman and Leblond (2011) also 
conclude that there is increased financial integration in the euro area, but the effects 
appear to be weaker than initially expected, due mainly to the significant differences 
across member countries in terms of institutional structures, in which corporate 
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governance rules and practices may play a major role. These differences seem to deter 
cross-border holdings and international risk sharing. 
Later, in 2008, the European Central Bank (ECB) issued additional warnings 
about integration in Europe. Although recognizing a considerable progress over the 
previous decade, mainly driven by the introduction of the euro, the ECB mentioned that 
the level of integration was far from the ideal. The ECB reported high level of 
segmentation in the infrastructures of the European securities markets, namely in equity 
markets.  
All those warnings about the effects of incomplete financial integration have 
proved to be important over the last two decades. Europe and in particular the euro area, 
suffered several structural changes of which the introduction of the common currency and 
the great financial crisis1 are the most important (Baele et al., 2004, Bremus and 
Fratzscher, 2015). As stated by Kalemli-Ozcan (2016), worse than the level of 
segmentation is the asymmetry between European countries which leads to irregular 
reaction to shocks. The lack of bank and fiscal union increases the vulnerability of 
European countries to adverse shocks (Kalemli-Ozcan, 2016). The 2016 report from the 
European Central Bank (2016) shows that the financial and sovereign debt crises led to 
substantial financial fragmentation, a process that has not been reverted so far. This lack 
of integration, along with a common currency and monetary policy, is itself a cause of 
structural issues inside the euro area increasing the negative effects of shocks and 
establishing a barrier to growth and financial efficiency (Gal, 2015). As demonstrated by 
the warnings issued in the previously mentioned studies, the introduction of a common 
currency was not, for itself, a sufficient integration tool (Gal, 2015).  
Due to the importance of financial market integration for the euro area, the ECB 
has been disclosing a set of indicators proxying financial integration and that are 
accompanied, since 2007, by an annual progress report on financial integration. The ECB 
constructs two composite indicators, a price-based and a quantity-based indicator, 
allowing a continuous monitoring of financial integration. The price-based financial 
                                                          
1 All mentions to financial crisis on this thesis reports to the 2007-08 global financial crisis which started 
with the subprime crisis at the end of 2007 and then developed into a global crisis with Lehman Brothers 
default on September 2008. 
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market integration indicator is computed using a selection of ten indicators that cover the 
main capital markets: money, bond, equity and banking markets. The quantity-based 
financial market integration is computed from a portfolio perspective, based on cross-
border holdings. The composite indicators range from zero (full segmentation) to one (full 
integration) and are used as guidance for the ECB initiatives and policy definition. As 
shown in Figure 1.1, the last report of the European Central Bank (2018), provides an 
extensive overview of the financial market integration development since 1Q95. 
 
Figure 1.1 - Price-based and Quantity-Based Financial Market Integration Composite Indicators   
Source: European Central Bank (2018) 
 
Figure 1.1 highlights the relevance of the warnings issued over the last decades 
and already mentioned. After a strong reinforcement of financial integration is clear after 
the euro introduction in 1999, there is a setback during the period of the most recent 
financial crisis. The first negative impact occurs after the subprime crisis at the end of 
2007 but the Lehman Brothers default on September 2008 precipitated the financial 
market integration to levels similar to that observed before the euro introduction. In 2012, 
in response to the financial crisis, the ECB announced the Banking Union and Outright 
Monetary Transactions (OMT). As shown in Figure 1.1, since then, there is an upward 
impact on financial market integration.  
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One of the main motivations of our study is to better understand the dynamics of 
financial market integration in recent times and how those fluctuations were reflected on 
equity investors’ cross border holdings.  
Due to the changes in financial market integration level over the last decades, the 
ECB has established the goals of risk reduction and improvement of cross-country risk 
sharing. Along with that, ECB is also looking to complete the banking union and reinforce 
the capital market union as key initiatives to strengthen the level of financial integration 
in future years. All initiatives mentioned are strictly connected, as capital market union 
will improve cross-border financial risk sharing, leading to smother effects of economic 
cycles. Furthermore, capital market union will only be possible with more efficient and 
resilient market infrastructures which are important facilitators of cross-border flows.   
Considering that financial integration is associated with the intensification of 
cross-border flows, a first macro scrutiny is possible through the dataset provided by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS). 
CPIS is a voluntary data collection that gathers information of cross-border holdings of 
equities and debt securities. A first experimental survey was conducted in 1997, yet only 
a limited number of countries responded, so any conclusion based on this year should 
take that into account as mentioned, e.g., by Galstyan and Lane (2010). Since 2001, IMF 
reported this data uninterruptedly.  
As mentioned before, the euro introduction had a positive impact on cross-border 
flows and thereafter plausibly on financial market integration as shown in Figure 1.2.   
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Figure 1.2 - Cross-border Equity Investment  
Source: International Monetary Fund (2018) 
 
Since 2001, the world cross-border flows increased in an expressive average 
annual rate superior to 30% from USD 5 trillion to more than USD 31 trillion. That is 
even more remarkable, considering the clear setback in the financial crisis period with a 
decrease of over 40% between 2007 and 2008. It took almost 6 years to reach the 2007 
levels. The cross-border investment originated in the euro area countries shows an 
increase slightly above average, with better figures in the first year after the euro 
introduction.  
Despite the expressive increase of cross-border flows, on average, the weight of 
EMU equities in European countries’ portfolios has stayed relatively stable over the 
period 2001-2017 as shown in Table 1.1. Yet, for many countries, e.g., Spain, Italy or 
Greece, there was a relevant increase: 
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Country 1997 2001 2007 2008 2017 
France 39% 51% 50% 51% 66% 
Germany NA 60% 71% 79% 70% 
Spain 46% 54% 72% 69% 83% 
Portugal 55% 66% 71% 69% 72% 
Italy 56% 64% 83% 87% 90% 
Greece NA 54% 44% 35% 92% 
Euro Area  43% 48% 51% 53% 52% 
      
United Kingdom 35% 42% 29% 29% 27% 
Denmark 32% 25% 28% 26% 29% 
Sweden 41% 33% 43% 42% 37% 
Non Euro Area (Europe) 36% 39% 32% 32% 30% 
   
 
 
 
Japan 17% 17% 20% 17% 13% 
United States (US) 31% 29% 25% 24% 22% 
Canada 12% 13% 16% 14% 10% 
Total Average 31% 35% 34% 34% 30% 
Table 1.1 - Weight of EMU Equities in Selected Countries’ Portfolios by Country/Region 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2018) 
 
Considering the amount invested in foreign assets, EMU equities represent on 
average 30% of that amount. Yet there are opposite behaviors for investors based inside 
the Euro Area and investors based in other European countries. Those based inside the 
Euro Area increase their investment in equities from other EMU countries since 1997, to 
a level as high as 90%, as it is the case of Italy and Greece in 2017. Investors based in 
other European countries reduced the weight of EMU equities over the period to levels 
close to 30%, close to the level observed for investors based outside Europe, e.g., 
investors based in the United States (US). This different behavior for investors based 
inside and outside the EMU could be interpreted as a first sign of imperfect financial 
integration even inside Europe. In countries outside Europe, the behavior is relatively 
stable, slightly decreasing over the period.  
Table 1.2 and Table 1.3 show the structure of the different country portfolios, with 
the weight of cross-border equity holdings:  
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2001 
Country Euro Area Non EA USA JPN Other 
France 51% 14% 21% 4% 11% 
Germany 60% 13% 18% 2% 8% 
Spain 54% 19% 15% 6% 6% 
Portugal 66% 7% 13% 1% 13% 
Italy 64% 7% 16% 4% 8% 
Greece 54% 19% 20% 1% 6% 
Euro Area  48% 13% 23% 4% 12% 
      
United Kingdom 42% 4% 23% 9% 22% 
Denmark 25% 24% 31% 5% 15% 
Sweden 33% 16% 37% 5% 9% 
Non Euro Area (Europe) 39% 7% 26% 8% 20% 
      
Japan (JPN) 17% 14% 54% - 15% 
United States (US) 29% 24% - 11% 37% 
Canada 13% 11% 58% 6% 11% 
Total Average 35% 16% 20% 6% 23% 
Table 1.2 - Weight of Cross-border Equity in 2001 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2018) 
2017 
Country Euro Area Non EA USA JPN Other 
France 66% 8% 11% 4% 12% 
Germany 70% 6% 12% 2% 10% 
Spain 83% 6% 5% 1% 5% 
Portugal 72% 5% 10% 2% 11% 
Italy 90% 4% 3% 0% 2% 
Greece 92% 1% 4% 0% 3% 
Euro Area  52% 8% 19% 3% 18% 
      
United Kingdom 27% 2% 35% 6% 30% 
Denmark 29% 11% 38% 4% 19% 
Sweden 37% 9% 30% 4% 20% 
Non Euro Area (Europe) 30% 4% 34% 6% 27% 
      
Japan (JPN) 13% 4% 30% - 53% 
United States (US) 22% 15% - 10% 53% 
Canada 10% 7% 59% 5% 18% 
Total Average 30% 9% 19% 6% 36% 
Table 1.3 - Weight of Cross-border Equity in 2017 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2018) 
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Investors based inside the Euro Area expand their weight on EMU equities by 
reducing their exposure especially to European (non-euro area) equities but also to US 
and Japanese equities. Considering that the euro introduction might have reduced the 
diversification gains inside the euro area, the final diversification benefits are 
controversial. On the other hand, investors based in other European countries (non-euro 
area) reinforced their exposure to US equities.  
These figures show, in a macro perspective, that investors have material different 
portfolio allocations and allocation shifts depending on their location. These results 
suggest imperfect integration for these countries.    
From an asset perspective, the relative weight of European equities has decreased 
substantially since 2001. For US and Japanese investors, the weight of European equities 
decreased, on average, 15 percentage points (pp) between 2001 and 2017. This apparently 
decrease of attractiveness of European equities is in part justified by the decrease of the 
weight of these equities in the world market capitalization, around 5 pp between 2001 and 
2017 (World Bank).  
 
1.2 Literature Review 
Financial Market Integration is defined, as in most previous studies, using the 
“The Law of One Price” principle that states that: (i) two assets that have identical risk 
and return should be priced identically; and that (ii) two economic agents with identical 
utility functions should have similar portfolio allocations (Babecky et al., 2013, Baele et 
al., 2004, Adam et al., 2002).  
From an asset pricing perspective, in a full financial markets integration scenario, 
returns would be generated by a single asset pricing rule and would be influenced only 
by global systematic risk factors (see, e.g., Adler and Dumas (1983), Errunza and Losq 
(1985) and Flood and Rose (2005) among others). However, direct barriers to free capital 
mobility prevent full financial market integration. Even within the same currency area, 
the existence of indirect barriers, such as tax and legal matters or accounting and auditing 
differences, impact the level of integration (Adam et al., 2002, Hartmann et al., 2003). 
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From an investor’s perspective, we should find a homogeneous allocation across 
investors domiciled in different countries. Yet, previous literature is quite consensual 
about the over preference for domestic assets, i.e., for stocks of companies based in the 
same country of the investor (Balta and Delgado, 2009, Schoenmaker and Bosch, 2008, 
Baele et al., 2007, Levy and Levy, 2014, Chan et al., 2009). That over preference for 
home assets, typically known as Home Bias (HB), is indicative of some degree of 
segmentation. Balta and Delgado (2009), e.g., use HB as a proxy of integration, and 
document increased levels of integration in the euro area over the last 20 to 25 years, even 
if heterogeneous across countries. Their evidence suggests further that the policies 
applied since the Lamfalussy report had different impacts in the euro area countries.   
 Cooper et al. (2013) characterized HB as the strongest and more persistence 
empirical phenomenon in finance that has puzzled academics for decades. Investors hold 
more domestic equities than any optimal choice theory could ever justify (Cooper et al., 
2013). Cooper et al. (2013) report that on average, the gap between the share of domestic 
equities and the weight of that country in the world market portfolio is about 75 
percentage points. 
HB is not the only geographic investment phenomenon described by previous 
literature. Portes and Rey (2005) show that investors do not only overinvest in home 
stocks but also overinvest in markets that are geographically close to their domestic 
markets. This preference for local stocks was initially described and denominated “local 
bias” by Coval and Moskowitz (1999). Additionally, another phenomenon is also 
commonly considered: Foreign Bias (FB) to describe the consequent relative underweight 
in stocks issued in markets more distant to home (Cooper et al., 2018).  
 The over preference for domestic assets is irrational according to the finance 
theory. Investors lose the benefits of international diversification, which would allow 
them to maximize return for a determined level of risk (Cooper and Kaplanis, 1986, 
French and Poterba, 1991, Schoenmaker and Bosch, 2008, Balta and Delgado, 2009). 
Essentially, finance theory assumes that the opportunity cost of under-diversification is 
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clearly superior to any benefit that could be driven by concentrating the portfolio in 
domestic equity market (Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008, Cooper et al., 2013)2.  
However, some extant literature states that this position ignores the possibility of 
international diversification at home. Errunza et al. (1999) show that it is possible to 
exploit diversification opportunities at home through the investment in domestically 
traded multinationals, closed-end country funds and American depositary Receipts 
(ADRs). Investors could mimic foreign market indices and achieve a portfolio that is 
internationally efficient using those domestic instruments (Errunza et al., 1999, Cooper 
et al., 2013). 
 The typical approach to measure HB is to compare the actual allocation with the 
optimal portfolio weight (Cooper et al., 2013). However, choosing the correct benchmark 
for the optimal portfolio could be challenging. Most of the previous literature follows the 
approach of determining the benchmark weights through an asset pricing model. The 
model commonly used is the CAPM or its international version (ICAPM) proposed by 
Solnik (1974) and Sercu (1980) (Cooper et al., 2013). Both models assume identical 
investment opportunities and that there are no transaction costs or taxes, so all investors 
should hold the world market portfolio. In this portfolio, the weight of each asset is equal 
to the relative share of the country in the world market capitalization (Cooper et al., 2013). 
After choosing the benchmarks, the simplest and more intuitive way to measure HB is 
the one followed by, e.g., Cooper and Kaplanis (1986) or Brealey et al. (1999) in which 
HB is given by the difference between actual and optimal allocation. Other and more 
complex approaches to measure HB emerged in more recent years. It is also worth 
highlighting the log-ratio scaled approach, used by Chan et al. (2005) and Lau et al. 
(2010), which enables to smooth larger biases, or the more recent measure advocated by 
Cooper et al. (2013) who proposes a logistic transformation of standardized bias to reduce 
the worst forms of heteroscedasticity. Finally, recovering the two related phenomena of 
Home and Foreign Bias other approaches, which focus on distance and gravity models, 
emerged relating HB to distance (Portes and Rey, 2005, Cooper et al., 2018, Floreani and 
Habib, 2018).  
                                                          
2 Nevertheless, according to distance models, investors may not take advantage of that diversification 
given that those gains are surpassed by the distance costs (Tesar and Werner, 1995). 
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Despite all the different proposals to measure HB, one outcome is common: the 
evidence is a high level of HB. Several studies try to understand this puzzle and suggest 
many arguments that could, at least in part, justify it. The arguments stressed by previous 
literature can be grouped in five main categories: (i) measurement issues; (ii) explicit 
costs and barriers; (iii) information asymmetries; (iv) corporate governance/transparency 
and agency differences; and (v) investor preferences (Balta and Delgado, 2009, 
Schoenmaker and Bosch, 2008, Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001, Cooper et al., 2013, 
Levy and Levy, 2014, Mishra, 2015). 
The first set concentrates some arguments/doubts about the necessity of hedging 
for home-country specific risks and investment abroad in order to achieve international 
diversification. Investors have typically larger exposure to domestic risks such as 
inflation, real exchange rate and risks from non-tradable goods (Cooper et al., 2013). So, 
investing in domestic stocks could be merely a way to hedge those risks. As shown by 
Friend et al. (1976), domestic stocks could be a good solution to hedge inflation risk. On 
the other hand, as exposed by Errunza et al. (1999) and others, international 
diversification may be achieved through domestic holdings. All that attained by avoiding 
international barriers to investment and higher transactions costs.  
Explicit costs and barriers are the second group of arguments and one of the 
earliest explanations to the HB phenomenon (Cooper et al., 2013). Those early studies 
pointed out a few arguments that could justify the over preference for domestic assets: (i) 
higher transaction costs for foreigners; (ii) withholding taxes; (iii) restrictions on foreign 
equity holdings; (iv) risk of expropriation and (v) control of capital flows (Black, 1974, 
Stulz, 1981, Errunza and Losq, 1985). The consensus about those arguments has never 
been achieved and a few studies show some contradictory facts. Additionally, some of 
these barriers could be true in the 80’s but have been dismantled since then. Bekaert and 
Harvey (1995) pointed out that when looking at emerging markets, other barriers could 
be more relevant. In this case, (i) poor credit ratings; (ii) high and variable inflation; (iii) 
exchange controls; (iv) poor regulatory and accounting standards and (v) lack of country 
funds and cross-listed securities might play a major rule. 
Information asymmetries is one of the most prevalent arguments raised by 
previous literature and follows a simple premise; investors prefer domestic stocks because 
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they perceive them as less risky (Cooper et al., 2013). That perception arises as investors 
claim to know and understand better the business practices and economic environment. 
Additionally, this information asymmetry could also be translated into extra costs in order 
to treat, translate and interpret information disclosed in a foreign language (Grinblatt and 
Keloharju, 2001). Investing in foreign stocks may lead to increased costs due to different 
cultures, religions or habits which could reduce the attractiveness to invest abroad 
(Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001). The previous studies that focused their study on 
information asymmetries used frequently proxies to measure it also controlling for other 
factors such as transaction costs. Based on those studies, the proxies used could be 
classified in three classes of proximity measures: (i) geographical proximity; (ii) cultural 
proximity and (iii) economic proximity (Ahearne et al., 2004, Sarkissian, 2004, Chan et 
al., 2005, Portes and Rey, 2005, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2008, Bekaert and Wang, 2009, 
Cooper et al., 2018). More recent studies show that even a very small perception of 
information advantage leads the investor to overinvest severely in domestic assets (Van 
Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2009, Andrade and Chhaochharia, 2010). However, if that 
information advantage is real, we should assume that investors would select their stocks 
better and consequently show higher returns on their investments. The previous empirical 
evidence is far from consensual and some studies, e.g., Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) 
and Huang and Shiu (2009) proved that foreign investors have higher returns than 
domestic investors and Seasholes and Zhu (2010) show that portfolios of local stocks do 
not have outperform global portfolios. In contrast, Malloy (2005) and Bae et al. (2008) 
show that local analysts outperform foreign analysts. Lastly, Bailey et al. (2006) also 
show that cross-listings contribute to decrease information asymmetries.  
The fourth category of arguments is partially linked to information asymmetry. 
The main drivers of HB are informal barriers such as lack of transparency, complexity 
and corporate governance issues at a company level and political risk at a country level 
(Cooper et al., 2013). At a company level typically, the corporate governance issues could 
emerge when companies are controlled by an insider shareholder and have limited free 
float and non-trivial likelihood of private benefits extraction (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, 
Dahlquist et al., 2003, Stulz, 2005, Giannetti and Simonov, 2006). As mentioned by Gelos 
and Wei (2005) both corporate governance and transparency influence international 
portfolios holdings. Foreigners are less attracted by companies based in countries with 
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less reliable financial and legal systems, with poor disclosure rules and with ownership 
structures that are conducive to governance problems (Gelos and Wei, 2005, Cooper et 
al., 2013). Along with the conflict between insiders and outsiders, there is an extra agency 
problem, the risk of expropriation (Stulz, 2005). This extra problem also affects 
international portfolio holdings in three ways: (i) countries with poor governance are 
conducive to the existence of controlling shareholders; (ii) smaller countries show more 
exposure to foreign investors and simultaneously investors based in these small countries 
need to invest abroad; and lastly (iii) countries with higher risk of expropriation have a 
lower fraction of wealth held by foreigners (Cooper et al., 2013).    
Scrutinized the rational explanations for the persistence of HB, a last and with 
increasing importance category of drivers for HB is based on behavioral finance theory. 
Psychological factors such as overconfidence, over optimism, familiarity, and patriotism 
are used to explain investors’ behavior (Fox and Tversky, 1995, Tversky and Kahneman, 
1991, M. Barber and Odean, 2001, Karlsson and Norden, 2007, Cooper et al., 2013, 
Solnik and Zuo, 2017). Previous studies demonstrate that investors miscalculate their 
competence on judging foreign stocks and their overconfidence, leading to an 
overinvestment in domestic assets based on the perception of information advantage 
(French and Poterba, 1991, Kilka and Weber, 2000, Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001, 
Strong and Xu, 2003, Dorn and Huberman, 2005, Schoenmaker and Bosch, 2008, Balta 
and Delgado, 2009, Levy and Levy, 2014, Mishra, 2015). However, as mentioned by 
Strong and Xu (2003) optimism alone does not seem to be sufficient to justify the high 
level of HB documented.   
More common behaviors such as “familiarity bias” or “friendship bias” have also 
been stressed (Merton, 1987, Huberman, 2001, Berkel, 2004). Huberman (2001) argues 
that investors prefer to hold stocks from familiar companies, which means domestic ones, 
and so investing in foreign assets generates a sense of discomfort and fear. Kang and Stulz 
(1997) reinforce this idea, showing that foreigners prefer large companies which could 
reflect a familiarity effect. This behavioral trait is somehow linked to the previously 
mentioned rational argument of information asymmetry: large companies are more well-
known and more liquid than smaller companies and it is easier to gather information about 
those companies, resulting in lower transaction costs (Kang and Stulz, 1997). More 
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recently another behavioral trait pointed out as a possible driver of HB is patriotism. 
Morse and Shive (2011) show in countries with higher patriotism level, home bias is more 
prevalent. Finally, some studies linked HB to a lack of investor sophistication 
(Goetzmann and Kumar, 2008, Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001, Karlsson and Norden, 
2007). 
Other studies have used different approaches to measure financial market 
integration. For example, Wojcik (2002) analyzes cross-border corporate holdings. 
Pungulescu (2013) looks at a battery of credit, bond and stock market indicators, as well 
as indicators based on household and firm decisions. Bekaert et al. (2013) look at industry 
valuation multiple differentials across markets. 
 
1.3 Purpose, Contribution and Overview of the Results 
We aim to improve our understanding of financial market integration by 
examining the portfolios of institutional investors.  
In chapter 2, we propose a new approach to measure financial market integration 
estimating geographical portfolio shifts during the last decades. We adapt the style 
investment model proposed by Sharpe (1988, 1992). We replace the original the style 
asset classes by geographic benchmarks.  
We contribute to the literature from a methodological standpoint, by proposing a 
new approach to measure financial market integration. We adapt a well-established 
model, used for different purposes, which is easier to apply and not so demanding in terms 
of data requirements and computational procedures. We show that our approach, although 
less demanding on data, is as robust as the previous approaches proposed by the existing 
literature. 
We further contribute to the literature by providing an extensive study of financial 
market integration in Europe and employing both return-based and holdings-based 
approaches to evaluate financial integration over time and across countries. We assess 
how financial market integration has evolved since the euro currency introduction in 1999 
and how the integration process was affected by the recent financial crisis. Finally our 
  
16 
 
study is among the first studies to explore and test the corporate insider theory 
implications for financial market integration. 
In chapter 2, we use a new return-based approach with a sample of 2,880 
investment funds investing in Europe from March 1999 to December 2013. Our findings 
show a clear preference for euro area stocks which become less evident after the euro 
introduction due to the increase of the relative importance of other non-euro factors. That 
pattern suffered a setback with the advent of the financial crisis, with the euro area factor 
regaining importance. Those findings reinforce the conclusions of previous studies that 
claim an intensification of the financial integration following the euro introduction, 
especially inside the euro area. However, we also find a reversion of the level achieved 
caused by the financial crisis. Additionally, when we split our dataset by fund location, 
we find different reactions and behaviors which also suggest partial financial 
segmentation, even inside the euro area.      
In chapters 3 and 4, we examine the portfolio holdings of a sample of European 
mutual funds. By looking at institutional investors’ portfolio holdings, we gain a better 
understanding of the geographical shifts on their allocation strategy and investment 
destinations, as well as of corporate ownership decisions. 
In chapter 3, we use an holdings-based approach to evaluate financial market 
integration. Assuming that home bias is a good proxy of financial market integration, we 
evaluate the role of the several arguments that have been put forward to explain home 
bias over time and across funds located in different European countries. We propose a 
specification model that accounts for the determinants of home bias. We evaluate the 
impact of the euro introduction, and of the global financial crisis. Our sample includes 
the holdings of more than 1,000 investment funds, domiciled in 16 different European 
countries, from 2Q97 to 2Q11. Home (euro) bias is estimated by the difference between 
actual and ICAPM optimal allocations. Our results are consistent with the evidence 
presented in chapter 2. Home bias has been decreasing since the euro introduction. 
Moreover, we find that home bias is lower inside the euro area suggesting different levels 
of integration in Europe. However, even inside the euro area, the level of integration is 
not equally shared by all members, with funds based in Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain 
showing higher excess exposure to domestic assets. Inside the euro area, the euro 
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introduction seems to have shifted investors’ preferences from domestic assets (home 
bias) to euro area assets (euro bias). The financial crisis has led to a setback, with an 
increase on the level of home bias. There is also evidence of a decrease in the financial 
stocks’ holdings, especially in those countries where the phenomenon of home bias is 
more pronounced, counterbalanced by an increase in investment in health care and energy 
stocks. 
Finally, in chapter 4 we refocus the analysis and examine portfolio holdings from 
a corporate ownership perspective. We look at domestic and foreign corporate ownership 
levels and explore to what extent cross-border corporate ownership levels reflect financial 
market integration. We propose a specification model to evaluate the role of corporate 
insider theory implications and other control variables to explain the time series and cross-
sectional variability of corporate ownership levels given by the holdings of a large sample 
of European investment funds. Our findings are consistent with the corporate insider 
theory but there are a few inconsistent results in particular when we rerun our model for 
different subsamples of funds and holdings. Overall results suggest imperfect integration 
but are not conclusive. 
All in all, the evidence we gathered from our multi-perspective analysis has given 
us a better understanding of the financial integration process in the euro area. Results 
support that financial market integration clearly improved after the euro introduction 
followed by a partial setback just after the outbreak of the last financial crisis. Over the 
last decade, within the euro area, the home bias phenomenon has been reduced and 
replaced by euro bias in portfolio allocation. Our results suggest a lower degree of 
integration in European equity markets outside the euro area. The evidence also supports 
different levels of integration within the euro area.         
The remaining of this thesis is structured in four chapters that include the three 
above mentioned essays and a concluding chapter that highlights the main research 
results, points out the major shortcomings and presents some suggestions for future work. 
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2. A NEW APPROACH TO MEASURE FINANCIAL 
MARKET INTEGRATION             
 
2.1 Introduction 
Considering the state of the art regarding the measurement of financial market 
integration, in this study, we propose an easier and intuitive way to measure financial 
market integration. The main contributions of the essay are to propose and empirically 
evaluate a new approach to measure integration focusing on geographical portfolio style 
shifts of equity investment funds. The idea of using portfolio holdings and the relative 
weights of home and foreign assets as an indirect measure of financial integration, was 
initially suggested by Adam et al. (2002). We follow their suggestion but instead of using 
portfolio holdings, we estimate the exposure of portfolio NAV returns to several 
geographic stock market benchmarks. As described by Dor et al. (2002) and Dor et al. 
(2008), using a Return Style Based Analysis (RBSA) approach should not bias our results 
due to the equivalence of both approaches (the return based and the holdings-based). 
Additionally, although the RBSA approach is easier to implement and interpret, there are 
some constraints: this approach relies on the correct specification of the benchmarks, it is 
difficult to draw conclusions concerning the future and, lastly, it is slow in detecting style 
changes (Dor et al., 2002, Maier and Scholz, 2018). In short, the advantage of our 
approach is the easiest application of the methodology, which is based on a very well 
accepted model. Furthermore, style analysis allows us to picture time varying integration 
with easily accessed data.  
Given that institutional investors, particularly investment funds, are the main 
players in today’s major capital markets in terms of equity holdings, we focus on equity 
investment funds. According to the Investment Company Institute (2015) and the 
International Investment Funds Association (2016), by the end of 2016 there were more 
than 80 thousand investment funds managing over USD 37 trillion of assets, of which 
USD 16 trillion were invested in stocks. This importance is also noticed by previous 
literature such as Faias et al. (2017) or Huang (2015). Despite their importance and their 
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professional management, mutual fund managers also display behavioral biases and, this 
way, could be representative of all investors (Pool et al., 2012).  
We focus on investment equity funds that invest mostly in the euro area. We also 
analyze a longer period of time when compared to previous studies. We assess how the 
process of stock market integration has evolved since the euro currency introduction in 
1999 and whether or not integration was affected by the recent financial crisis. 
In our study, we use the Lipper data set by Thomson Reuters that includes equity 
funds invested mostly in the euro area. After excluding offshore, small and highly 
concentrated funds, our sample consists of 2,880 funds from March 1999 to December 
2013. We have adapted the style investment model proposed by Sharpe (1988, 1992) to 
estimate the geographic allocation of investment fund portfolios. 
Our findings indicate an increasing importance of the euro area benchmark factor 
over time, which is in line with the evidence reported in previous studies. However, the 
level of importance is clearly time-varying showing a gradual decrease sometime after 
the introduction of the euro. This decrease accompanies an increase in the relative 
importance of the stock market factors outside the euro area, particularly regarding to 
Europe non-euro and to the US/Canada factors3. With the advent of the financial crisis4, 
we observe that the euro area factor regains a large part of its initial importance when 
compared to other factors, and is mirrored by the decrease in the exposure to the stock 
market benchmark outside the euro area, in particular the exposure to the US benchmark 
factor. This “euro bias” phenomenon is in line with the findings of Balli et al. (2010). 
We performed several model variations, mostly to test the effects of currency 
factors and/or the domicile of the fund. The results are robust except for the subsample of 
funds domiciled outside the euro area which confirms the prominence and increasing 
exposure to the euro factor. The decrease in financial integration following the financial 
crisis is similar to funds based inside and outside the euro area but, thereafter, we find no 
evidence of a reversion to the pre-crisis level of exposure to the euro area factor. In the 
                                                          
3 The Europe non-euro factor excludes all the European countries that belong to the euro area. 
4 We establish the advent of the crisis as the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy in September 2008. 
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case of non-euro area funds, the evidence suggests that there is a different level of 
integration inside and outside the euro area. 
In order to validate the finding of excessive exposure to home or euro area factors, 
we construct a different specification for the style investment model. We simply redefine 
the independent variables/factors used, considering now only three factors: a benchmark 
for home, for the euro area and for the rest of the world. We find evidence that reinforces 
the idea that the financial crisis increased the phenomenon of home (euro) bias. 
Nevertheless, we also find that the impact differs across countries, even inside the euro 
area, suggesting different levels of financial integration.   
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the 
data and the methodology, Section 2.3 presents our main results and Section 2.4 presents 
the main conclusions and final remarks. 
 
2.2 Data, Methodology and Variables 
2.2.1 Sample Description 
We use the Lipper investment fund dataset from Thomson Reuters, the selection 
obtained included funds that invest in average more than 70% in stocks based in the euro 
area between March 1999 and December 20135. We collect fund data, on a monthly basis, 
regarding the actual status6, the domicile, currency, Net Asset Values (NAV) and Total 
Net Assets (TNA). Based on this information, we computed NAV returns in euros (RNAV) 
and in the denomination currency of the fund (RNAVL), as well as the number of 
shares/units of each fund. 
We identified a total of 7,274 funds, but many of these funds had missing 
information, extreme values for TNA, unusual number of shares and other potential 
                                                          
5 The dataset obtained, for which we did not previously make any pre selection, does not provide 
information related to the countries/regions of investment. We selected a subsample and through the public 
information available on Morningstar, Inc website we analyzed the allocation strategy of each fund. On 
average, the funds in the subsample invested 73.6% of the NAV in stocks based in the euro area, reaching 
86.9% when considering all the European Stocks. The maximum allocation in stocks based in the euro area 
was around 99% and the minimum around 50%. The remaining was invested in stocks based outside 
Europe.     
6 Status indicates whether the fund is actually active or has been liquidated or merged into another. 
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problems. For example, 130 funds had less than 100 shares and 200 funds had a TNA 
below 10,000 euros, with very limited liquidity and, in some instances, owned only by a 
single investor. In addition, 75% of the funds were domiciled in only four countries.  
Following previous studies that used the Lipper dataset, in which those issues had 
also been identified, we eliminate funds that met the criteria suggested in Ferreira et al. 
(2012, 2013). We first eliminated funds with ten or less shares and with TNA less than 
ten thousand euros. Secondly, to identify funds that most probably were not actively 
managed, we removed those funds with domicile in a country that had less than ten funds 
registered in the Lipper dataset. Finally, and to avoid bias generated by funds that might 
have been created for tax management or other legal purposes, we eliminated all funds 
domiciled in offshores7. The final sample includes a total of 2,880 funds.  
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics for the sample funds. 45% are based in 
France and over 65% are based in four countries. These funds manage assets over 199 
billion euros while the average fund manages close to 70 million euros. Across countries, 
there are wide differences in terms of the number of funds, size and value of assets under 
management.  
 
Country Number % 
NAV per Share € 
[Average] 
TNA M€ 
[Average] 
TNA M€  
[Sum] 
France 1,288 45 37,313 68 87,019 
Germany 209 7 1,803 115 23,945 
Spain 186 6 92 43 8,000 
USA 180 6 13 103 18,464 
Canada 162 6 9 41 6,710 
Belgium 160 6 1,090 72 11,455 
Austria 119 4 957 29 3,460 
Italy 105 4 9 180 18,875 
Korea (Republic of) 74 3 1 4 311 
UK 54 2 10 83 4,482 
Finland 54 2 61 94 5,061 
Japan 48 2 64 19 904 
Denmark 47 2 73 64 3,012 
Chile 46 2 51 4 195 
                                                          
7 We follow the criteria by IMF Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department (2000) to define offshore 
countries, eliminating funds, e.g., based in Luxembourg and Cayman Islands.  
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Country Number % 
NAV per Share € 
[Average] 
TNA M€ 
[Average] 
TNA M€  
[Sum] 
Australia 37 1 6 10 358 
Sweden 33 1 25 128 4,238 
Portugal 20 1 12 34 677 
Norway 12 0 92 78 941 
Saudi Arabia 12 0 60 39 472 
Argentina 12 0 0 1 14 
Greece 11 0 10 43 476 
Poland 11 0 47 14 157 
Total 2,880 100 16,932 69 199,224 
Table 2.1 - Mutual Funds by Domicile Country 
 
Our sample composition is in line with the figures reported by the European Fund 
and Asset Management Association at the end of 2013. Excluding the funds domiciled in 
offshores, France is clearly the country with the most funds and, consequently, a higher 
concentration of Total Net Assets, Germany and Spain follow.  
 
2.2.2 Methodology 
Considering that our purpose is to understand financial integration on the basis of 
investment fund portfolio allocation, we use a model that allows estimating the allocation 
preferences of fund managers over time, and in particular, a model that analyzes fund 
exposure to the euro and non-euro area stocks. We use the widely adopted Style Analysis 
model of Sharpe (1988, 1992), that we have adapted to capture geographic style exposure 
and exposure shifts.  
 Sharpe’s model (1992) was devised to classify funds a priori defined restricted 
asset classes. The model uses quadratic programming to find the exposures of a fund NAV 
returns to the returns of a set benchmark asset classes (Sharpe, 1988). The model is indeed 
a generic factor model: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖1𝐹1𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖2𝐹2𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖𝑁𝐹𝑁𝑡 + ℯ𝑖𝑡 (2.1) 
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 where (𝑅𝑖𝑡) is the periodic investment return, (𝐹𝑗𝑡) is the value of the jth factor (j=1 to 
N), 𝛽𝑖𝑗 is the sensitivity of fund i to factor j, ℯ𝑖𝑡 is the residual (Atkinson and Choi, 2001). 
The main objective is to find the best asset allocations 𝛽𝑖𝑗 to the asset classes restricted to 
a total exposure of 100% (sum of 𝛽𝑖𝑗). This allocation/style (set of asset class exposure) 
is reached by minimizing the sum of residual squared (∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 ) with all constraints in 
equation (2.2): 
 
∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 = [𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (𝛽𝑖1𝐹1𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖2𝐹2𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖𝑁𝐹𝑁𝑡)]
2 (2.2) 
 
Indeed, this technique is similar to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation. The 
objective is identical; to minimize the sum of residual squared. However, in the quadratic 
programming some constraints are imposed on the exposure coefficients for which OLS 
could not be so flexible. 
 
2.2.3 Model Specification and Variables Definition 
In our base model specification below RNAV are the NAV returns of the investment 
funds. The independent variables are four geographic benchmark factors. 
 
𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖1𝐸𝑀𝑈𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖2𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑀𝑈𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖3𝑈𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖4𝑃𝐴𝐶𝐼𝐹𝑡 + ℯ𝑖𝑡 (2.3) 
As in the original Sharpe model (1992), RNAV is given by: 
 
𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑡 =  ln (
𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑡
𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑡−1
⁄ )  (2.4) 
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NAVs are expressed in euros. Yet, a significant part of funds presented on the 
database are not domiciled in the euro area8. Thus, in order to understand the currency 
impact, we also calculated the returns in local currencies (RNAVL).  
While in the original Sharpe model (1992) the independent variables represent 
different asset classes, in our model the independent variables represent stock market 
benchmark indices of different geographic regions9. The selection of these variables is 
expected to follow the attributes presented by Sharpe (1992): exclusive; exhaustive and 
not correlated. Due to the exclusivity attribute, and considering that we intend to analyze 
the euro area, we select factors that clearly separate assets based in the euro area and those 
in European countries that do not belong to the euro area. As referred to by Agudo and 
Gimeno (2005), two assets cannot belong to different factors at the same time.   
In our specification model in (2.3) we use four factors. The first factor selected is 
a benchmark of the euro area (EMU). The second factor is a benchmark of the other 
European markets that do not belong to the euro area (Europe exEMU).  
To evaluate the exposure to markets outside Europe, we consider two geographic 
factors based on a preliminary analysis of the sample funds domiciled therein. These 
include the US and Canada (USCA), representing almost 12% of funds in the database, 
and Japan and Australia (PACIF) with almost 3%. 
The benchmark factors are proxies of the correspondent region or country stock 
market returns and were selected based on the previous literature. We use MSCI indices 
as in, e.g., Carrieri et al. (2007), Hau (2011) and Boubakri and Guillaumin (2011). For 
the euro area, we selected MSCI EMU; for other European stock markets excluding 
equities based in the euro area, we selected MSCI Europe ex-EMU; for the US and 
Canada, we selected MSCI North America; and, for Japan and Australia, we selected 
MSCI Pacific.  
To assess the robustness of our results, we test some variants of the base model. 
Since the major impact of a common currency area is the elimination of currency risk, we 
                                                          
8 Circa 25% of the funds in our sample were not domiciled in the euro area. The US dollar is the second 
most important currency with 7% of the total funds in the sample. 
9 A first attempt of rearranging the Sharpe model to understand the geographic exposures has already been 
performed by Rodríguez (2008); however, the purpose was to analyze fund manager performance. 
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consider an alternative specification with a control variable given by the changes in the 
effective foreign exchange rate of the euro. This exchange rate is calculated by the 
European Central Bank (2013), accounting for the relative weight of the euro area 
commercial partners and the respective bilateral exchange rate. We include the exchange 
rate of euro as control variable, without imposing any limitation on the estimated 
procedure as we have done for the other factors, allowing us to extract the effect of the 
exchange rate that could influence the exposure to non-euro benchmarks in the base 
model.    
 
 
𝑅𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖1𝐸𝑀𝑈𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖2𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑋𝐸𝑀𝑈𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖3𝑈𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖4𝑃𝐴𝐶𝐼𝐹𝑡 
+𝛽𝑖5𝐹𝑋_𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑡 + ℯ𝑖𝑡  (2.5) 
 
 
 
Table 2.2 defines the variables used in the empirical tests. 
Variable Code Currency Definition 
Net Asset Value NAV EUR  Net Asset Value per share/unit  
Total Net Assets TNA EUR  Total Net Assets under management 
Net Asset Value Local NAVL LOCAL  Net Asset Value per share in local currency 
NAV Return RNAV EUR  Monthly return of the fund in euros 
NAVL Return RNAVL LOCAL  Monthly return of the fund in local currency 
Euro area factor EMU EUR  Euro area stock market benchmark  
US and Canada factor USCA EUR  US and Canada stock market benchmark  
Europe non euro area factor  Europe exEMU EUR  Europe excluding euro area stock market benchmark  
Pacific area factor PACIF EUR  Pacific stock market benchmark  
Effective FX_Euro FX_Euro -  Percentage change in Euro effective exchange rate factor 
Table 2.2 - Variable Definition 
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As described in Section 2.2.2, Sharpe’s model (1992) uses quadratic optimization 
as estimation method. Yet, this methodology does not enable to test statistical inference. 
So, in order to reinforce the robustness of our results, we also use other estimation 
procedures to determine the exposures of fund NAV returns to the returns of a set 
benchmark asset classes. Given that the Quadratic Optimization (QO) is equivalent to 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation10 with constrained parameters, we estimate the 
parameters in this way.  
For that, we impose two constraints. The first is a no leverage constraint, which 
allows us to closely approximate the return of the fund to a portfolio that reflects similar 
weights in terms of geographical exposure. The second is a no short sales constraint. 
Despite equivalent results, as Sharpe’s model (1992) uses quadratic optimization, 
we decided to present both results. 
 
2.3 Preliminary Results 
2.3.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 2.3 shows the summary statistics for the NAV returns measured in euros 
(RNAV) on a cross section perspective, Table 2.4 shows the summary statistics for NAV 
returns in local currency (RNAVL) and Table 2.5 shows the summary statistics for the 
NAV returns measured in euros (RNAV) on a times series perspective. 
Recovering the discrepancies across countries in terms of the number of funds, 
size and value of assets under management referred to in Section 2.2.1, Table 2.3, we find 
that the RNAV also varies widely across countries, but for the countries in the euro area 
with the highest number of funds domiciled, we find similarities. France, Germany, Spain, 
and Belgium show an average RNAV of around 0.03%. In contrast, we find the average 
RNAV for funds domiciled outside Europe, the USA, Canada, Korea, and Japan showing 
an average negative return. These findings are strengthened when we compose those 
statistics for funds domiciled inside and outside the euro area.  
 
                                                          
10 Our data base is an unbalanced panel with a total number of 255,365 observations. 
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Domicile Country Mean Std. Deviation Kurtosis Skewness 
 N. of 
Funds 
France 0.032% 1.395% 64.582 -5.904  1,288 
Germany 0.030% 0.626% 5.568 -0.041  209 
Spain 0.048% 0.617% 6.224 -1.452  186 
USA -0.012% 0.706% -0.042 0.206  180 
Canada -0.072% 0.591% 1.704 -0.412  162 
Belgium 0.032% 0.916% 4.113 -1.192  160 
Austria -0.018% 0.729% 13.262 -2.281  119 
Italy 0.117% 0.409% 1.950 0.384  105 
Korea (Republic of) -0.765% 2.335% 24.887 -4.413  74 
UK -0.340% 1.905% 16.751 -3.940  54 
Finland 0.244% 0.509% 1.050 0.314  54 
Japan -0.043% 0.710% 6.137 1.611  48 
Denmark 0.012% 0.809% 6.602 2.107  47 
Chile -0.069% 0.411% -0.206 0.0392  46 
Australia 0.120% 0.699% 2.053 0.038  37 
Sweden -0.069% 0.602% 3.694 -0.0846  33 
Portugal -0.306% 1.356% 17.501 -4.055  20 
Norway 0.198% 0.230% 3.546 1.577  12 
Saudi Arabia -0.455% 1.397% 4.919 -2.013  12 
Argentina 0.151% 0.895% 3.494 -0.327  12 
Greece -0.259% 0.389% 0.034 -0.925  11 
Poland -0.309% 0.792% 2.522 -1.111  11 
       
Domicile Region Mean Std. Deviation Kurtosis Skewness 
 N. of 
Funds 
EMU 0.035% 1.167% 80.410 -6.196  2,152 
Non EMU -0.133% 1.122% 69.522 -6.145  728 
       
Total -0.007% 1.158% 77.265 -6.141  2,880 
Table 2.3 - RNAV by Domicile Country 
 
Table 2.4 shows the summary for NAV sectioned by currency. For funds 
denominated in euros the results are essentially very similar because most of these funds 
are domiciled in the euro area and represent almost 75% of all dataset. For the other 
currencies, the impact of the exchange rate is noticeable in higher standard deviation and 
for important currencies like the USD, we find in our dataset that those funds are 
domiciled in almost all countries considered, it being impossible to compare the results 
between domicile (Table 2.3) and funds’ currency (Table 2.4).   
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Fund’s currency Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skewness 
 N. of 
Funds 
Argentina Peso (ARS) 1.008% 1.153% 2.582 1.134  7 
Australia Dollar (AUD) -0.076% 0.655% 1.551 -0.131  37 
Canada Dollar (CAD) -0.158% 0.599% 0.557 -0.439  154 
Chile Peso (CLP) 0.330% 0.435% 0.177 0.778  42 
Denmark Kone (DKK) 0.023% 0.827% 6.158 2.038  45 
Euro (EUR) 0.028% 1.187% 77.182 -6.124  2,158 
United Kingdom Pound (GBP) 0.389% 0.738% 1.202 1.309  5 
United Kingdom Penny (GBX) -0.053% 1.567% 30.709 -5.195  41 
Japan Yen (JPY) 0.113% 1.130% 9.403 2.544  48 
Korea (South) Won (KRW) -0.511% 2.064% 38.576 -5.633  74 
Norway Krone (NOK) 0.193% 0.210% 2.677 1.352  12 
Poland Zloty (PLN) -0.101% 0.761% 1.014 -0.323  9 
Sweden Krona (SEK) -0.073% 0.603% 3.869 -0.819  33 
United Sates Dollar (USD) 0.207% 0.840% 7.359 0.632  214 
Table 2.4 - RNAVL by Currency 
 
Table 2.5 shows a different perspective of our dataset. In a time series perspective, 
we also find some discrepancies on the average RNAV between the time windows. As 
expected in the financial crisis period, we find more fluctuation between two sub 
consecutive periods, although with limited standard deviation between funds. The impact 
of the financial crisis in the average RNAV seems to be analogous across all funds. Lastly, 
the number of funds considered in each sub-period is worth highlighting. The maximum 
number of funds considered is more than 3 times superior to the minimum, and in average 
between two consecutive sub-periods the average change is superior to 20%. We could 
reduce this volatility by excluding the funds that were closed or merged but that could 
impose a survivorship bias in our results.     
   
 
Sub-periods Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skewness  
N. of 
Funds 
Mar99-Feb01 -0.13% 3.21% 182.850 -10.934  589 
Mar01-Feb03 -2.63% 2.02% 29.319 -0.810  818 
Mar03-Feb05 1.15% 4.28% 585.126 -22.085  1,317 
Mar05-Feb07 1.20% 1.44% 170.520 2.522  1,617 
Mar07-Feb09 -3.30% 2.80% 232.597 -11.775  1,882 
Mar09-Feb11 1.91% 1.55% 81.637 -5.596  1,946 
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Sub-periods Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skewness  
N. of 
Funds 
Mar11-Feb13 -0.21% 1.42% 452.056 -15.238  1,812 
Mar13-Dec13 1.35% 0.61% 10.640 -1.621  1,582 
Table 2.5 - RNAV by Sub-period 
 
Table 2.6 shows the summary statistics for the benchmark returns measured in 
euros that proxy the geographical factors in the style analysis model. These are the 
statistics of the returns over the entire period used to obtain the estimated exposures from 
March 1999 to December 2013. Average returns vary widely across region and we do not 
find a direct relation between the benchmarks and the return of the funds domiciled in the 
corresponding countries. For example, on average, the return of the funds domiciled in 
the euro area is 0.035% while the benchmark of this area has an average return of  
-0.008%. This fact could reflect that the funds, even if invested primarily in the euro area, 
have an investment strategy that is not totally in line with the benchmark of the area 
reflected; perhaps there is an international investment propensity. 
 
Code Currency Mean Std Deviation Kurtosis Skewness 
EMU EUR -0.008% 5.393% 4.206 -0.772 
USCA EUR 0.171% 4.306% 3.435 -0.569 
Europe exEMU EUR 0.131% 4.097% 3.702 -0.690 
PACIF EUR 0.095% 4.440% 3.392 -0.219 
FEX_Euro EUR -0.005% 1.369% 4.047 0.524 
Table 2.6 - Univariate Analysis 
 
2.3.2 Correlation between Geographic Benchmarks 
Table 2.7 demonstrates the correlation between the benchmark geographic factors 
for the entire period and in eight sub-periods11. We observe high and significant 
correlation coefficients. Over time, correlation coefficients change but always with high 
levels of significance. In the first sub-periods the levels of correlation increased, reflecting 
either greater stock market integration or, in some periods, the widely documented effect 
                                                          
11 Identical sub-periods to the ones considered in the estimation tests. 
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of increasing co-movement between markets when markets conditions are bad or in 
extreme market conditions, as was the case from 2007 onwards.  
 
 
   
Entire 
Period 
Mar99-
Feb01 
Mar01-
Feb03 
Mar03-
Feb05 
Mar05-
Feb07 
Mar07-
Feb09 
Mar09-
Feb11 
Mar11-
Feb13 
Mar13-
Dec13 
EMU-USCA 0.738*** 0.710*** 0.875*** 0.760*** 0.796*** 0.771*** 0.555*** 0.567*** 0.497*** 
EMU-Europe exEMU 0.871*** 0.798*** 0.947*** 0.896*** 0.888*** 0.856*** 0.821*** 0.802*** 0.899*** 
EMU-PACIF 0.619*** 0.506*** 0.619*** 0.203*** 0.737*** 0.790*** 0.465*** 0.534*** 0.273*** 
EMU-FEX_Euro 0.029*** -0.196*** -0.423*** 0.174*** -0.381*** 0.313*** 0.300*** 0.106*** -0.478*** 
USCA-Europe exEMU 0.841*** 0.882*** 0.917*** 0.750*** 0.753*** 0.898*** 0.661*** 0.779*** 0.676*** 
USCA-PACIF 0.717*** 0.733*** 0.685*** 0.511*** 0.581*** 0.805*** 0.768*** 0.689*** -0.000 
USCA-FEX_Euro -0.298*** -0.303*** -0.610*** -0.030*** -0.612*** -0.172*** -0.107*** -0.326*** -0.670*** 
Europe exEMU-PACIF 0.742*** 0.617*** 0.702*** 0.168*** 0.785*** 0.862*** 0.794*** 0.754*** 0.332*** 
Europe exEMU- 
FEX_Euro 
-0.184*** -0.293*** -0.569*** 0.047*** -0.42*** -0.05**** 0.049*** -0.137*** -0.634*** 
PACIF-FEX_Euro -0.270*** -0.321*** -0.549*** -0.226*** -0.436*** 0.04*** -0.223*** -0.374*** -0.537*** 
Table 2.7 - Correlation between Benchmark Factor Returns 
 
Over the last periods, we notice a volatility increase in the correlation level, which 
could be driven by the turbulent periods after the crisis. Worth highlighting is the descent 
correlation between the pacific variable and others in the last sub-period.  
The high correlation observed is a potential statistical problem to implement the 
style analysis model, given that the chosen factors are required to be independent (Sharpe, 
1992). To overcome this problem, we implement several procedures such as the use of 
orthogonal factors; the use of standardized variables and the construction of a Ridge 
Regression. The detail of these procedures and correspondent results are presented in 
section 2.4.3. 
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2.4 Model Results and Analysis 
2.4.1 Exposure to Euro and Non-Euro Factors 
The model is estimated, on an aggregated basis, for sub-periods allowing us to 
study how the exposures to the different geographic benchmarks have changed over time, 
and to understand the impact of the euro introduction and the financial crisis. Over the 
period from March 1999 to December 2013, we consider eight two years’ sub periods. 
These are: March 1999 to February 2001; March 2001 to February 2003; March 2003 to 
February 2005; March 2005 to February 2007; March 2007 to February 2009; March 
2009 to February 2011; March 2011 to February 2013 and March 2013 to December 
201312.  
According to the international version of the CAPM, in a full integration scenario, 
investors should hold the world market portfolio. This portfolio assumes that investors 
should hold equities in each foreign country j equal to the relative market capitalization 
of country j in the global market capitalization (Solnik, 2000, Schoenmaker and Bosch, 
2008). In our model, mutual fund managers allocate their wealth mostly in European 
assets so we expect, in a full integration scenario, that the exposures to each benchmark 
are close to the relative weight of each benchmark in the European market capitalization.  
The estimated results of the base model (Equation 2.3) indicate a clear and strong 
importance of the euro area benchmark factor. This is in line with our expectations given 
that our sample is composed of funds that claim to focus on euro area stocks.  
Furthermore, the results show a high level of statistical strength with an increasing 
R-square, reaching levels around 70% in the two latter sub-periods. In addition, almost 
all benchmark factors exposures are significant at the 1% level. The estimated exposures 
to EMU and Europe exEMU are significant at the 1% level in all sub-periods. 
The most remarkable feature is the time-varying magnitude of exposure to the euro area 
benchmark. Over the sub-periods analyzed, we show increasing exposure to benchmarks 
outside the euro area. This is the case for the factor proxy of the US and Canadian stocks 
that shows increasing exposures up until the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy in September 
2008.  
                                                          
12 Due to the fact that the data available ends in December 2013, the last sub-period is smaller with only 10 
months considered. 
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On the other hand, the behavior of the average R-square for the sub-periods could 
also be informative of structural changes in the behavior of the mutual funds that is not 
detected through optimization. Despite the fact that the funds claim to invest mainly in 
the euro area, it appears that they were exposed to other benchmarks in the first sub-
periods immediately after the introduction of the euro, a behavior that seems to be 
reversed later with the financial crisis. 
The base model allows us to highlight four important effects, illustrated in Figure 
2.1 and shown in Table 2.8. These effects are: 
- a strong importance of the euro area’s benchmark at the beginning of the sample 
period; 
- a decreasing importance of the euro area’s benchmark from March 1999 to 
February 2005;  
- an increase of the exposure to the euro area’s benchmark in the latter sub-periods, 
with a surge just before the financial crisis, and 
- a stabilization after the beginning of the financial crisis; yet, the euro area’s 
benchmark importance is still below than the observed in the first sub-period.  
 
Exposures (in %) EMU USCA Europe exEMU PACIF  
Adjusted 
R2 
N. of 
Funds 
 QO OLS QO OLS QO OLS QO OLS  OLS  
Mar99-Feb01 79.3% 79.3%*** 0.0% 0.0% 20.7% 20.7%*** 0.0% 0.0%  0.89% 589 
Mar01-Feb03 44.3% 44.3%*** 0.0% 0.0% 55.7% 55.7%*** 0.0% 0.0%  7.34% 818 
Mar03-Feb05 39.1% 39.1%*** 24.5% 24.5%*** 35.8% 35.8%*** 0.6% 0.6%  7.92% 1317 
Mar05-Feb07 68.6% 68.6%*** 3.9% 3.9%*** 27.4% 27.4%*** 0.2% 0.1%  12.40% 1617 
Mar07-Feb09 64.7% 64.7%*** 0.0% 0.0% 28.1% 28.1%*** 7.2% 7.2%***  23.69% 1882 
Mar09-Feb11 61.4% 61.4%*** 0.0% 0.0% 27.5% 27.5%*** 11.1% 11.1%***  31.44% 1946 
Mar11-Feb13 60.5% 60.5%*** 8.4% 8.4%*** 28.7% 28.7%*** 2.4% 2.4%***  74.14% 1812 
Mar13-Dec13 60.7% 60.7%*** 14.2% 14.2%*** 25.1% 25.1%*** 0.0% 0.0%  69.36% 1582 
  ***significant at 1% level 
  **significant at 5% level 
  *significant at 10% level 
  Quadratic Optimization (QO)  
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
Table 2.8 - Style Analysis - Based Model 
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Figure 2.1 - Style Analysis - Based Model 
 
The initial high level of importance of the euro area’s benchmark and subsequent 
decrease is in line with previous literature that refers to a positive impact resulting from 
the introduction of the euro. Additionally, it is also in line with comments provided by 
Adam et al. (2002) that pointed to an increase until June 2001 in euro area equities by 
funds with an international investment strategy. The reverse in the level of integration 
caused by the recent financial crisis has been documented as well by Pungulescu (2013), 
Babecky et al. (2013) and Lehkonen (2014). Pungulescu (2013) links the decrease in the 
financial integration process to the increase of risk and the phenomenon of contagion, 
both of which have been referred as negative sides of the financial integration. For 
example, Babecky et al. (2013) state that the financial crisis had a negative effect on all 
financial segments and across all countries considered in the study13.  
Table 2.9 shows the results using the extended model specification including the 
foreign exchange variable as control variable (Equation 2.5). The differences to the base 
                                                          
13 In their study, Babecky et al. (2013) considered the following countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States and the euro area as region. 
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model are not significant and the main conclusions persist. The foreign exchange variable is statistically significant in almost all periods 
although the estimated coefficient tends towards zero. The results prove that the exposure to the geographic benchmarks is not affected by 
the effective foreign exchange rate of the euro. 
Exposures (in %) EMU USCA Europe exEMU PACIF FEX_Euro 
 Adjusted 
R2 
N. of 
Funds 
 QO OLS QO OLS QO OLS QO OLS QO OLS  OLS  
Mar99-Feb01 78.6% 78.6%*** 0.0% 0.0% 21.3% 21.3%*** 0.0% 0.0% 0.05 0.05***  1.06% 589 
Mar01-Feb03 46.6% 46.6%*** 0.0% 0.0% 53.3% 53.3%*** 0.0% 0.0% 0.05 0.05***  7.51% 818 
Mar03-Feb05 37.0% 37.0%*** 25.2% 25.2%*** 36.8% 36.8%*** 1.0% 1.0% 0.01 0.01***  7.93% 1,317 
Mar05-Feb07 69.5% 69.5%*** 5.6% 5.6%*** 23.4% 23.4%*** 1.5% 1.5% 0.01 0.01***  12.42% 1,617 
Mar07-Feb09 61.3% 61.3%*** 0.0% 0.0% 32.5% 32.5%*** 5.0% 5.0%*** 0.01 0.01***  23.72% 1,882 
Mar09-Feb11 63.1% 63.1%*** 0.0% 0.0% 26.6% 26.6%*** 10.3% 10.3%*** -0.01 -0.01***  31.46% 1,946 
Mar11-Feb13 60.4% 60.4%*** 8.4% 8.4%*** 28.7% 28.7%*** 2.4% 2.4%*** 0.00 0.00  74.14% 1,812 
Mar13-Dec13 60.1% 60.1%*** 14.3% 14.3%*** 25.6% 25.6%*** 0.0% 0.0% 0.02 0.02***  69.70% 1,582 
  ***significant at 1% level 
  **significant at 5% level 
  *significant at 10% level 
Quadratic Optimization (QO)  
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
Table 2.9 - Style Analysis with Euro Foreign Exchange Rate Factor 
 
We further investigated if the behavior observed was identical for all the funds. Our aim was to understand how fund managers located 
in the different counties changed the geographic mix of the portfolios over the sample period. Therefore, to conduct this analysis, we split 
the database by the domicile of the fund.  
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We consider two partitions: the first splits the funds between those domiciled in 
the euro area and those domiciled outside; the second funds based in Europe and funds 
based outside Europe. We do not find any significant differences between the two 
partitions criteria, used for the subsets of funds in the geographical portfolio allocation. 
The results obtained show slight differences between the subset of funds inside and 
outside the euro area. For this latter subsample, we notice a gradual decrease in exposure 
to the euro area factor that is not reverted to initial exposures with the onset of the 
financial crisis. The results are illustrated in Figure 2.2 and shown in Table 2.10. We 
notice a gradual increase of the weight of the European non-euro area factor, suggesting 
a preference for stocks that are closer to the domicile of the fund. For example, the 
exposure to the USCA benchmark increased across the sub periods. For the euro area 
subsample, the results are very similar to the ones obtained for the base model.  
 
Panel A – Mutual Funds based inside the Euro Area 
Exposures (in %) EMU USCA Europe exEMU PACIF  
Adjusted 
R2 
N. of 
Funds 
 QO OLS QO OLS QO OLS QO OLS  OLS  
Mar99-Feb01 70.1% 70.1%*** 0.0% 0.0% 29.8% 29.8%*** 0.0% 0.0%  0.25% 366 
Mar01-Feb03 44.0% 44.0%*** 0.0% 0.0% 56.1% 56.1%*** 0.0% 0.0%  6.10% 482 
Mar03-Feb05 43.7% 43.7%*** 22.1% 22.1%*** 33.8% 33.8%*** 0.4% 0.4%  7.46% 908 
Mar05-Feb07 75.4% 75.4%*** 2.1% 2.1% 22.5% 22.5%*** 0.0% 0.0%  11.4% 1,231 
Mar07-Feb09 70.7% 70.7%*** 0.0% 0.0% 21.0% 21.0%*** 8.3% 8.3%***  19.4% 1,407 
Mar09-Feb11 66.8% 66.8%*** 0.0% 0.0% 25.2% 25.2%*** 8.0% 8.0%***  28.4% 1,462 
Mar11-Feb13 67.9% 67.9%*** 7.0% 7.0%*** 22.2% 22.2%*** 2.9% 2.9%***  77.2% 1,390 
Mar13-Dec13 69.4% 69.4%*** 16.5% 16.5%*** 14.1% 14.1%*** 0.0% 0.0%  74.4% 1,227 
  ***significant at 1% level 
  **significant at 5% level 
  *significant at 10% level 
Quadratic Optimization (QO)  
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
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Panel B - Mutual Funds based outside the Euro Area 
Exposures (in %) EMU USCA Europe exEMU PACIF  
Adjusted 
R2 
N. of 
Funds 
 QO OLS QO OLS QO OLS QO OLS  OLS  
Mar99-Feb01 95.1% 95.1%*** 0.0% 0.0% 4.9% 4.9% 0.0% 0.0%  6.43% 223 
Mar01-Feb03 44.8% 44.8%*** 0.0% 0.0% 55.2% 55.2%*** 0.0% 0.0%  9.77% 336 
Mar03-Feb05 30.0% 29.6%*** 29.7% 30.9%*** 39.5% 39.5%*** 0.9% 0.0%  8.67% 409 
Mar05-Feb07 47.3% 51.8%*** 9.4% 0.0% 42.7% 48.2%*** 0.7% 0.0%  18.65% 386 
Mar07-Feb09 46.8% 46.8%*** 0.0% 0.0% 49.2% 49.2%*** 4.0% 4.0%***  66.43% 475 
Mar09-Feb11 44.1% 44.1%*** 2.9% 2.8%** 35.6% 35.6%*** 17.5% 17.5%***  57.19% 484 
Mar11-Feb13 36.2% 36.1%*** 13.3% 13.6%*** 49.7% 50.3%*** 0.8% 0.0%  67.24% 422 
Mar13-Dec13 30.5% 30.5%*** 14.5% 14.5%*** 55.0% 55.0%*** 0.0% 0.0%  56.74% 355 
  ***significant at 1% level 
  **significant at 5% level 
  *significant at 10% level 
Quadratic Optimization (QO)  
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
Table 2.10 - Style Analysis for the Mutual Funds based Inside/Outside the Euro Area 
 
Figure A – Mutual Funds based inside the Euro Area 
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Figure B - Mutual Funds based outside the Euro Area 
 
Figure 2.2 - Style Analysis: Funds based Inside/Outside the Euro Area 
 
The analysis of the subsamples was informative because it revealed that the 
reported U-shaped behavior is not observed for funds domiciled outside the euro area. 
Furthermore, the importance of the euro area benchmark decreased continuously after 
February 2007 while there was still time variation in the exposures to other factors outside 
the euro. These findings suggest that the financial crisis may have impacted the 
preferences of funds based outside the euro area. The reduction of the exposure to euro 
area stocks could reflect home bias behavior which is consistent with the euro bias 
observed for funds domiciled in the euro area.  
These results are in line with previous literature that states the crisis period was 
characterized by increased upheaval with investors concerned more with liquidity and 
credit risk, and thus leading to a decrease of cross-border activity with growth preference 
for domestic assets. The investors’ nervous behavior along with the geographic 
discrimination seems to have weakened the integration process (Babecky et al., 2013). 
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2.4.2 Home bias  
To obtain further insight on home bias behavior, we redefine the factors of the 
style model. We estimate the model considering three geographic benchmark factors: a 
benchmark factor of the country where the fund is based, a benchmark of the euro area14 
and a benchmark for the world excluding the euro area. We test the bias considering (a) 
the entire dataset and with three subsets of funds; (b) funds in a country belonging to the 
euro area; (c) funds in a European country outside the euro area and (d) funds based in a 
non-European country.  
When we split the sample into subsamples of funds domiciled in the euro area and 
funds domiciled outside the euro area, we are aware that investors’ holdings may differ. 
Taking into account that the dataset is composed of funds that invest primarily in stocks 
based in the euro area, it is likely that an investor based in the euro area does not have the 
same portfolio (or identical preferences) as an investor based in the US or in the UK15. 
Furthermore, there may be different levels of integration in countries belonging to the 
euro area and in countries outside the euro area. 
For (a), we used a benchmark of the world excluding the euro area; a benchmark 
of the euro area excluding the country taken into account (i.e., if it belongs to the euro 
area otherwise, the benchmark used is the normal euro area benchmark), and the national 
stock market benchmark. Table 2.11 (Figure 2.3) shows the results of the EMU factor 
which is the most important factor. Comparing Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.3, we find several 
similarities: the exposure to the EMU factor is higher in the first sub-period; afterwards 
we observe a more balanced exposure to all benchmarks.  
  
                                                          
14 If the country belongs to the euro area, we use a benchmark of the euro area excluding the country 
considered. Otherwise we use the benchmark of the entire euro area. 
15 This would be true if all markets were fully integrated. 
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Exposures (in %) Home World exEMU EMU (exHome)  
Adjusted 
R2 
N. of 
Funds 
 QO OLS QO OLS QO OLS  OLS  
Mar99-Feb01 4.0% 4.0%* 0.0% 0.0% 96.0% 96.0%***  0.70% 589 
Mar01-Feb03 22.5% 22.5%*** 0.0% 0.0% 77.5% 77.5%***  6.34% 818 
Mar03-Feb05 15.9% 15.9%*** 38.9% 38.9%*** 45.2% 45.2%***  7.88% 1,317 
Mar05-Feb07 4.0% 4.1%*** 22.9% 22.9%*** 73.0% 73.0%***  12.12% 1,617 
Mar07-Feb09 16.6% 16.6%*** 27.0% 27.0%*** 56.4% 56.5%***  23.69% 1,882 
Mar09-Feb11 17.6% 17.6%*** 26.7% 26.7%*** 55.7% 55.7%***  31.17% 1,946 
Mar11-Feb13 20.2% 20.2%*** 29.5% 29.5%*** 50.3% 50.3%***  74.60% 1,812 
Mar13-Dec13 17.6% 17.6%*** 29.0% 29.0%*** 53.4% 53.4%***  69.57% 1,582 
  ***significant at 1% level 
  **significant at 5% level 
  *significant at 10% level 
Quadratic Optimization (QO)  
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
Table 2.11 - Home Bias Test 
 
 
Figure 2.3 - Home Bias Test 
 
The results reveal that the importance of the Home factor gradually decreases after 
the introduction of the euro but increases in the periods just before and during the financial 
crisis. We also observe that the exposure to the World excluding EMU factor has an 
inverse behavior to the Home factor, consistent with the view that the euro introduction 
led to an increase in the financial integration that has reversed with the financial crisis.  
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Regarding (b) we also estimate the exposure for the entire subset of funds in the 
countries that belong to the euro area and in the top three countries in terms of the number 
of funds domiciled: France, Germany and Spain. The results are shown in Table 2.12 
(Figure 2.4). When compared to the entire sample (a) we see that funds domiciled in euro 
countries have more balanced exposures to all benchmarks, but the EMU benchmark is 
the greatest. These findings suggest a higher level of integration within the euro area.  
 
Exposures (in %) Euro Area Countries 
  Home 
EMU 
exHome 
World 
exEMU 
  
Adjusted 
R2 
N. of 
Funds 
Mar99-Feb01 8.4%* 86.1%*** 5.5%  0.00% 366 
Mar01-Feb03 43.3%*** 56.7%*** 0.0%  5.64% 482 
Mar03-Feb05 14.3%*** 45.9%*** 39.8%***  7.31% 909 
Mar05-Feb07 23.4%*** 59.7%*** 16.8%***  11.32% 1,231 
Mar07-Feb09 15.7%*** 58.4%*** 25.9%***  19.25% 1,407 
Mar09-Feb11 19.8%*** 54.6%*** 25.5%***  27.98% 1,462 
Mar11-Feb13 20.3%*** 52.2%*** 27.5%***  76.98% 1,390 
Mar13-Dec13 18.8%*** 53.8%*** 27.4%***   73.62% 1,227 
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   ***significant at 1% level 
   **significant at 5% level 
   *significant at 10% level 
Table 2.12 - Home Bias Test for Euro Area Countries 
 
  
Exposures (in %)
Home
EMU 
exHome
World 
exEMU
Adjusted 
R
2
N. of 
Funds
Home
EMU 
exHome
World 
exEMU
Adjusted 
R
2
N. of 
Funds
Home
EMU 
exHome
World 
exEMU
Adjusted 
R
2
N. of 
Funds
Mar99-Feb01 0.0% 100.0%*** 0.0% 11.92% 62 90.1%*** 0.0% 9.9% 0.00% 156 43.1%*** 54.6%*** 2.3% 1.78% 35
Mar01-Feb03 0.4% 99.6%*** 0.0% 7.31% 77 100.0%*** 0.0% 0.0% 6.09% 202 0.0% 91.7%*** 8.3% 6.56% 47
Mar03-Feb05 9.5%*** 48.3%*** 42.2%*** 33.03% 105 37.8%*** 26.0%*** 36.2%*** 3.89% 448 21.7%*** 56.1%*** 22.2%*** 75.93% 95
Mar05-Feb07 15.0%*** 69.3%*** 15.7%*** 80.81% 134 43.0%*** 45.7%*** 11.3%*** 6.75% 655 14.4%*** 61.8%*** 23.8%*** 87.80% 132
Mar07-Feb09 6.3%*** 78.5%*** 15.2%*** 74.22% 145 56.6%*** 25.1%*** 18.3%*** 12.35% 801 18.3%*** 63.7%*** 18.0%*** 85.33% 143
Mar09-Feb11 0.0% 61.3%*** 38.7%*** 74.66% 140 38.9%*** 35.1%*** 26.0%*** 22.75% 898 19.9%*** 63.6%*** 16.5%*** 84.14% 119
Mar11-Feb13 24.9%*** 38.8%*** 36.3%*** 74.58% 133 37.6%*** 37.6%*** 24.8%*** 80.14% 875 13.0%*** 70.7%*** 16.3%*** 84.78% 105
Mar13-Dec13 19.3%*** 42.8%*** 37.9%*** 67.60% 118 48.9%*** 27.9%*** 23.2%*** 79.26% 773 6.1%*** 88.0%*** 5.9%** 81.32% 86
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Figure 2.4 - Home Bias: Euro Area Countries 
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On the other hand, when we look at each of the top three countries, we find 
different patterns. For Spain and Germany, the results, as expected, show that the major 
exposure is to the benchmark of euro area excluding the country. Countries have a similar 
exposure to the other benchmarks. Additionally, as mentioned in section 2.4.1, according 
to the international version of the CAPM, in a full integration scenario, investors should 
hold a weight of domestic equities identical to the relative market capitalization of home 
country in the global market capitalization. So, in Figure 5, we include this CAPM 
benchmark in order to evaluate the presence of home bias. As shown, Spanish and 
German investors are overinvesting in domestic assets in almost all sub-periods. The 
results point to the presence of home bias and also suggest euro bias behavior.  
For France, the results are different. The exposure to the home factor is substantial, 
particularly when compared to the CAPM benchmark level. The highest level of 
importance of the home factor occurs in the first sub periods and then decreases after 
February 2003. The increase in the latter sub periods for domestic benchmark is consistent 
with the idea that the financial crisis increased the phenomenon of home bias.  
For (c) we also checked the behavior of the funds domiciled in the UK. The results 
are shown in Table 2.13 (Figure 2.5). The exposure to the Home factor is significant and 
higher when compared to Spain and Germany, suggesting a stronger home bias due to a 
higher deviation from the benchmark given by CAPM. The evolution of the euro area 
factor, with the highest level in the first sub period and then a decrease in the later sub 
periods, suggests that funds domiciled outside the euro area shift their preference for 
assets based outside the euro area.  
 
Exposures (in %) UK World exEMU EMU  
Adjusted 
R2 
N. of 
Funds 
 QO OLS QO OLS QO OLS  OLS  
Mar99-Feb01 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.4% 99.6% 99.6%***  2.74% 13 
Mar01-Feb03 60.8% 60.7%*** 0.0% 0.0% 39.2% 39.3%***  8.64% 23 
Mar03-Feb05 26.6% 26.6%*** 73.4% 73.4%*** 0.0% 0.0%  14.47% 30 
Mar05-Feb07 25.5% 25.5%*** 0.0% 0.0% 74.5% 74.5%***  78.03% 34 
Mar07-Feb09 35.4% 35.4%*** 0.0% 0.0% 64.6% 64.6%***  66.39% 39 
Mar09-Feb11 42.2% 42.2%*** 0.0% 0.0% 57.8% 57.8%***  20.80% 41 
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Exposures (in %) UK World exEMU EMU  
Adjusted 
R2 
N. of 
Funds 
 QO OLS QO OLS QO OLS  OLS  
Mar11-Feb13 26.8% 26.8%*** 20.1% 20.1%*** 53.1% 53.1%***  74.20% 30 
Mar13-Dec13 24.0% 24.0%*** 39.8% 39.8%*** 36.2% 36.2%***  71.99% 19 
  ***significant at 1% level 
  **significant at 5% level 
  *significant at 10% level 
Quadratic Optimization (QO)  
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
Table 2.13 - Home Bias Test for Mutual Funds based in the UK 
 
 
Figure 2.5 - Home Bias: Funds based in the UK 
 
Finally, for the funds domiciled in the US16 (d), our guess was that the exposure 
to the Home factor would be null given that they are investing mostly in the euro area. 
Nevertheless, after the introduction of the euro currency, the EMU factor shows a 
decrease in importance as indicated in Table 2.14 (Figure 2.6). Comparing Figure 2.1 and 
Figure 2.6, we observe that the behavior of the euro area factor is the symmetric to the 
World exEMU factor, suggesting a positive impact of the euro introduction on worldwide 
                                                          
16 We test for the entire subset with countries that do not belong to euro area. The results (not reported, but 
available upon request) show a lower importance of the home factor balanced with a higher importance of 
the world factor. The results suggest more balanced exposures to all benchmarks after the introduction of 
the euro and in the later sub periods after the first impact of the financial crisis. 
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financial integration. The two latter sub-periods reinforced the perspective of more 
balanced exposures after the negative effects of the financial crisis, with the US factor 
gaining significant importance while the euro area factor stabilized in a level of 
importance clearly below the initial levels, in 1999. Overall, we observe more balanced 
exposures to all benchmarks (local and foreign) after the euro introduction and excluding 
the shock of the financial crisis, indicating that the importance of location has been 
decreasing over the last 15 years. 
Exposures (in %) US World exEMU EMU  
Adjusted 
R2 
N. of 
Funds 
 QO OLS QO OLS QO OLS  OLS  
Mar99-Feb01 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0%***  9.00% 73 
Mar01-Feb03 0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 1.9% 98.1% 98.1%***  9.06% 108 
Mar03-Feb05 0.0% 0.0% 40.6% 40.6%*** 59.4% 59.4%***  72.98% 117 
Mar05-Feb07 0.0% 0.0% 44.5% 44.5%*** 55.5% 55.5%***  49.78% 80 
Mar07-Feb09 0.0% 0.0% 72.0% 72.0%*** 28.0% 28.0%***  55.37% 80 
Mar09-Feb11 0.0% 0.0% 52.3% 52.3%*** 47.7% 47.7%***  71.16% 84 
Mar11-Feb13 0.0% 0.0% 52.6% 52.6%*** 47.4% 47.4%***  77.29% 87 
Mar13-Dec13 14.8% 14.8%*** 38.6% 38.6%*** 46.6% 46.6%***  73.76% 84 
  ***significant at 1% level 
  **significant at 5% level 
  *significant at 10% level 
Quadratic Optimization (QO)  
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
Table 2.14 - Home Bias Test for Mutual Funds based in the US 
 
Figure 2.6 - Home Bias: Funds based in the United States 
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2.4.3 Robustness Tests 
In order to access the robustness of our results, we perform some additional 
analyses described below. 
As mentioned in section 2.3.2, the high level of correlation between factors, with 
some coefficients above 0.75, could be a problem, given that multicollinearity is in itself 
a violation of one requirement to implement the style-based Sharpe model (1992).  
In order to test for multicollinearity, we calculate the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) for each factor. Figure 2.7 pictures the VIF. VIF are below 10 (10 is usually 
considered as the level of which we can conclude for multicollinearity). Nevertheless, 
and as we find that EMU and Europe exEMU factors show a VIF superior to 4, we 
perform some additional tests in order to check if our results are influenced by that.  
 
Figure 2.7 - Variance Inflation Factor 
 
We start by using the residual series (orthogonal variables), that result from 
regression the critical variables against each other, as an alternative to the raw 
independent variables, but we still observe similar VIF (not included here for space 
constraints but available upon request). We then used standardized variables, but once 
again we reach the same results: high level of correlation and similar VIF results 
(available upon request). Lastly, we use a Ridge Regression, technique that allows 
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analyzing regressions which suffer from multicollinearity. As shown in Figure 2.7, by 
imposing a lambda of 0.04, we reduce all the VIF above 4 (in all the periods). Table 2.1517 
shows that, while changing slightly the regression estimates, the results are robust and so 
the high level of correlation does not seem to affect our main conclusions. 
 
Exposures (in 
%) 
EMU USCA Europe exEMU PACIF  
Adjusted 
R2 
N. of 
Funds 
 OLS Ridge OLS Ridge OLS Ridge OLS Ridge  OLS  
Mar99-Feb01 74.8%*** 66.8% 8.3% 4.9% -24.5%** -13.4% -11.8%*** -10.1%  1.92% 589 
Mar01-Feb03 64.5%*** 66.9% -58.9%*** -30.3% 135.9%*** 83.6% -81.9%*** -79.3%  12.09% 818 
Mar03-Feb05 36.2%*** 34.1% 26.6%*** 27.5% 40.2%*** 40.5% 7.6% 7.3%  7.93% 1317 
Mar05-Feb07 70.9%*** 59.8% 2.6% 7.0% 22.1%*** 26.7% 7.7% 2.9%  12.42% 1617 
Mar07-Feb09 65.6%*** 59.1% -4.1%* 0.6% 30.1%*** 28.2% 5.1%*** 8.8%  23.72% 1882 
Mar09-Feb11 62.4%*** 55.8% 5.2%*** -1.3% 25.0%*** 33.1% 10.6%*** 5.1%  31.59% 1946 
Mar11-Feb13 60.4%*** 56.7% 7.3%*** 7.5% 28.9%*** 30.7% 2.1%*** 3.3%  74.15% 1812 
Mar13-Dec13 66.3%*** 55.5% 7.3%*** 3.6% 17.5%*** 31.7% -9.0% -9.3%  70.67% 1582 
  ***significant at 1% level 
  **significant at 5% level 
  *significant at 10% level 
Table 2.15 - Ridge Regression 
 
To enable inference of statistical significance not allowed by quadratic 
optimization, as mentioned in Section 2.2.3, we simultaneously apply and compare two 
techniques: quadratic optimization (QO) and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation18. 
The results of the application of the OLS estimation with period weights provides support 
for the model statistical strength. In the base model, the average adjusted R-square 
increases over time, reaching levels of around 70% in the two latter sub-periods. In 
                                                          
17 Considering that Eviews does not allow constraints on the estimated coefficients, when applied the Ridge 
Regression technique, Table 2.15 compares the results between the application of Ridge Regression 
technique and the application of the OLS (without any restriction).   
18 We also test the application of the estimation through OLS without any restriction or robustness least 
squares (RLS) (results not reported, but available upon request). The results are satisfactory as, in almost 
all sub-periods, the restrictions were respected (even though not having been imposed). When in the first 
model some exposures are negative, in the second they are simple zero and without any statistical 
significance. In Eviews, the advantage of the utilization of the OLS without restrictions is the possibility of 
using period weights. That possibility is relevant as the average R square across all sub-periods is above 
62% (in the restricted method the R square average is slightly above 30%). Despite all the different 
estimation methods, the main conclusions subsisted which in itself is evidence of robustness. 
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addition, most variables are significant at the 1% level. The variables EMU and Europe 
exEMU are significant at 1% level in all sub-periods. 
Finally, considering that, funds based in France represent almost half of the 
sample, we rerun the regression excluding all funds based in France. The results, available 
upon request, are similar. 
 
2.5 Summary and Main Conclusions 
This chapter proposes a new approach to analyze and measure financial 
integration. We apply the style analysis model from Sharpe (1992) to address the level 
and changes over time in financial integration. Overall, our new methodology, based on 
an adaptation of a model used for different purposes, proves to be robust, while being 
easier to apply and not demanding in terms of data requirements and computational 
procedures. Furthermore, we analyze a longer period which considers a very significant 
time for the euro area, that is, the introduction of the single currency and the efforts for 
more integration following the financial crisis. 
Using the Lipper’s dataset, we adapt the style analysis model to evaluate how 
managers change their portfolio geographical allocation following the introduction of the 
euro and after the beginning of the financial crisis.  
Our findings confirm previous evidence that documented an intensification of the 
financial integration following the euro introduction. The results show that immediately 
after the euro introduction, the returns of funds are mainly driven by the EMU benchmark. 
After that initial period we show an increasing more balanced exposure to other 
benchmarks outside Europe. Nevertheless, we also show a reversion in the level of 
financial integration starting just before the financial crisis and that with the 
intensification of the financial crisis funds became more exposed to the euro area. This 
behavior is observed particularly for funds based in the euro area. These results reinforce 
the recent literature that describes the intensification of home/euro bias behavior as one 
of the consequences of the financial crisis, a different behavior for funds domiciled in 
different locations suggests partial financial segmentation, even inside the euro area.  
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3. EUROPEAN INVESTMENT FUNDS EQUITY 
HOLDINGS AND FINANCIAL MARKET 
INTEGRATION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in chapter 1, the literature is rather consensual about the benefits of 
international diversification. According to the International Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(ICAPM) investors could fully eliminate idiosyncratic risk by holding a fully 
internationally diversified portfolio (Solnik, 1974). As such, world market diversification 
entails lower risk when compared to what would be achieved by investing solely in 
domestic markets (Schoenmaker and Bosch, 2008). In previous empirical tests, 
considering European investors, the gains of international diversification, are estimated 
between 2 and 3 percent per year19, considering the same level of risk (Schoenmaker and 
Bosch, 2008).  
In spite of the evidence of the advantages of international diversification, French 
and Poterba (1991) and several studies thereafter (Baele et al., 2007, Schoenmaker and 
Bosch, 2008, Chan et al., 2009, Levy and Levy, 2014) report high levels of preference for 
domestic assets, a phenomenon that has been since then denominated as home bias. More 
recent studies mention that home bias has gradually changed, for a preference not only to 
home but also to the nearness, leading to a local or regional bias, driven by less stringent 
capital controls and the resulting intensification of capital flows (Aabo et al., 2013, 
Baltzer et al., 2013, Bernile et al., 2015, Baltzer et al., 2015).  
This seems to be the pattern of equity holdings in the euro area. Previous literature 
has shown that the introduction of the euro led to an increase in financial integration along 
with a decline of the home bias. This is shown, for example, by Pungulescu (2015) that 
measures home bias as a proxy for level of financial integration.  
                                                          
19 The gains from international diversification are measured as extra return that investors could obtain if 
they change the current portfolio allocation to the optimal portfolio stated by ICAPM.  
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 Balli et al. (2010) report a decline in the home bias together with an increasing 
preference for local assets in Europe: the euro bias. Euro area investors show an excess 
exposure to assets of companies within the euro region, when compared to the optimal 
exposure implied by the ICAPM (Balli et al., 2010). ICAPM states that in a full 
integration scenario, benchmark weights are given by the proportion each country has in 
the global equity market portfolio (Baele et al., 2007, Vermeulen, 2013). 
Many studies came across with several explanations for the home bias puzzle. 
Arguments can be divided in three categories: structural, informative and behavioral. 
Currency risk, diversification capacity, common trading platforms and transaction costs 
are among some of the most relevant structural drivers. Information asymmetry and 
excess of confidence are, respectively, an example of informative and behavioral 
drivers20.  
Given the evidence of home bias and the inability of the ICAPM framework to 
explain investors’ holding choices, other theoretical arguments emerged, such as the 
Corporate Insider Theory (Stulz, 2005, Kho et al., 2009). This approach points out 
differential arguments to account for home bias, arguing that, domestic investors allocate 
a more significant part of their wealth in one company in order to have corporate control. 
Since not all shares freely float, resulting in that institutional and particularly foreign 
institutional investors most likely will not be able to own the portions that would be 
dictated by ICAPM and consequently increase holdings in their domestic markets. 
Expropriation risk and the inability of the legal system to protect the minority 
shareholders’ interests could also be considered as drivers of the “home bias” since these 
features usually deter more severely foreign investors. 
Supported in the arguments for the home bias phenomenon, our study analyzes 
the impact of the euro introduction and the recent financial crisis on the allocation strategy 
of European investors. We look at those arguments to assess the drivers of home and euro 
bias and to measure the changes in the allocation strategy of European investment funds 
in the period between the pre introduction of the euro and just after the recent financial 
crisis. While there is evidence supporting the existence of euro bias in portfolio holdings 
                                                          
20 See, for example, Baele et al., 2007, Lutje and Menkhoff, 2007, Chan et al., 2009, Aabo et al., 2013, 
Thapa et al., 2013, Levy and Levy, 2014, Baltzer et al., 2015, Mishra, 2015. 
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of European investors and increasing financial integration in the euro area, the impact of 
the euro introduction and the recent financial crisis in the allocation strategy of the 
European investors has not yet been established. 
 In chapter 2, we use a return-style analysis to assess the level of equity market 
integration in the euro area using investments return fund data. In this chapter we analyze 
portfolio holdings as in Dor et al. (2002) to assess the robustness of those findings and 
the implications for financial market integration.  
Following some related studies, such as Baele et al. (2007), De Santis and Gérard 
(2009), Chan et al. (2009), Vermeulen (2013), Thapa et al. (2013) and Mishra (2015), we 
use the weights provided by ICAPM as the benchmark to measure the bias in the portfolio 
weights.  
Our analysis focuses on institutional investors’ holdings21.  
Despite the proclaimed professional management, investment funds managers 
may also suffer from behavioral bias such as the excess of confidence or over preference 
for companies based in the country where they live or were born22.  
We use a dataset by Thomson Reuters that has information on the holdings of 
investment funds based in Europe that potentially invest in assets all over the world. Our 
sample consists of 1,063 funds domiciled in 16 different European countries and covers 
the period from 2Q97 to 2Q1123. 
We adapt the specification model proposed by Thapa et al. (2013) using the 
measures of the home and euro bias as the dependent variable. The explanatory variables 
are proxies of the arguments that have been put forward to explain the phenomenon of 
home bias (that we reviewed thoroughly in section 1.2, Chapter 1). We also include 
dummies to control for time and location effects. 
                                                          
21 According to Investment Company Institute (2015) and The International Investment Funds 
Association (2016), by the end of 2015, there were almost 80 000 investment funds managing over USD. 
37 trillion of assets, of which USD 16 trillion were invested in stocks. 
22 See for example Lutje and Menkhoff (2007) and Pool et al. (2012). 
23 Our dataset was obtained by merging of two separate data sets. For the period between 2Q97 and 3Q07 
we do not have information regarding the industry of each holding. As such, we evaluate the industry 
allocation impact of the period pre and post financial crisis. 
  
52 
 
Our findings suggest that funds based inside the euro area have lower home bias. 
These lower levels of home bias are specially observed after the euro introduction and 
along with an increased preference for euro area assets. Our findings are consistent with 
increasing financial market integration inside the euro area boosted by the euro 
introduction.  
Yet, our results also show that the financial integration process inside the euro 
area is not the same for all member countries. We show that funds based in Portugal, Italy, 
Greece and Spain, hold more domestic assets which could reflect lower levels of 
integration in these countries. 
Our study also indicates that the financial crisis has led to a setback on the level 
of home bias, suggesting that home bias increases in periods of financial turmoil. We also 
document a decrease in the holdings in the financial industry well beyond the contraction 
in market capitalization of the industry. This decrease was counterbalanced by an increase 
in holdings in health care and energy industries. We also document that funds based 
outside the euro area hold more stocks of companies in non-tradable industries. Along 
with a higher level of home bias, this could suggest a lower level of integration in 
European countries outside the euro area given that exposure to these industries is a poor 
hedge for domestic shocks. 
Overall, our findings show that, along with the overall impact of the euro 
introduction reducing home bias and the setback caused by the financial crisis, there are 
still different levels of integration across euro area countries.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
the empirical methodology. Section 3 presents the empirical results and Section 4 
summarizes and concludes.  
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3.2 Data, Methodology and Variables 
3.2.1 Data and Sample 
We collect portfolio holdings from a Thomson Reuters dataset that comprises 
1,063 investment funds based in sixteen different European countries24. Investment funds 
in our sample have no restrictions in their geographic investment policies. These funds 
are equity funds and thus invest mainly in stocks but may also invest in other financial 
assets like bonds or derivatives and cash.  
The dataset contains information regarding the equity holdings of the funds. 
Equity holdings are available on a quarterly basis, for the period between June 
1997 and June 2011. The dataset includes also information about the investment style, 
level of turnover and domicile of the fund. For all the stocks that compose the portfolio, 
we collect information on headquarters of the company, industry25, shares outstanding, 
share prices and number of shares held. Based on that information, we calculate the equity 
portfolio value, the percentage invested in stocks domiciled in the same country as the 
fund (holdings in home stocks), the percentage invested in stocks based in the euro area 
(holdings in euro area stocks) and in other different non-euro regions (non-euro Europe, 
America, Asia and Africa. We classify holdings in eleven industry categories: Health 
Care; Financials; Industrials; Consumer Staples; Energy; Diversified; Technology; 
Telecommunication; Services; Materials; Consumer Discretionary and Utilities. 
Additionally, we separated industries into two major groups: tradable and non-
tradable industries, based on the guidelines of Zeugner (2013).   
Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics for the funds in our sample. Over fifty 
percent of the funds are based in only three countries (France, Germany and the UK). This 
high level of concentration is in line with the figures reported by the European Fund and 
Asset Management Association for the end of 2013. More than one third of the funds are 
based in the United Kingdom (UK). France and Germany come next with, respectively, 
61 and 125 funds. Countries with more funds show aggregated higher value of assets 
                                                          
24 56% of funds are based inside the euro area and 44% are based in European countries that do not belong 
to the euro area, mainly, England. 
25 These are only available for the period between 4Q07 and 2Q11. 
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under management (NAV). In line with the figures reported by the European Fund and 
Asset Management Association, France is the country where investment funds have the 
highest value of assets under management. We also find that funds based outside the euro 
area are, on average, greater in terms of NAV when compared to those within the euro 
area.  
 
Country 
/Region 
Number % 
NAV M€ 
[Average] 
%Home 
[Average] 
%Euro 
Area 
[Average] 
%Europe  
[Average] 
%Asia 
[Average] 
%America 
[Average] 
%Africa 
[Average] 
Austria 55 5% 133 14% 42% 24% 17% 16% 0% 
Belgium 33 3% 413 11% 54% 22% 4% 20% 0% 
Denmark 45 4% 376 17% 24% 36% 22% 18% 0% 
Finland 43 4% 216 42% 62% 16% 14% 9% 0% 
France 61 6% 1,254 45% 65% 18% 5% 11% 0% 
Germany 125 12% 1,149 31% 55% 17% 13% 15% 0% 
Greece 41 4% 102 84% 90% 3% 2% 5% 0% 
Ireland 36 3% 749 3% 34% 21% 26% 19% 0% 
Italy 25 2% 462 38% 64% 17% 10% 10% 0% 
Luxembourg 29 3% 264 5% 41% 19% 16% 23% 1% 
Netherlands 47 4% 1,011 18% 46% 17% 13% 23% 0% 
Portugal 51 5% 84 34% 69% 8% 7% 16% 0% 
Spain 46 4% 218 52% 81% 11% 1% 7% 0% 
Sweden 64 6% 1,096 47% 16% 62% 10% 12% 0% 
Switzerland 6 1% 836 7% 31% 46% 15% 6% 2% 
UK 356 34% 1,387 43% 22% 49% 15% 13% 1% 
          
Euro Area 592 56% 625 32% 58% 16% 11% 14% 0% 
Non Euro 
Area 
(Europe) 
471 44% 1,256 41% 22% 50% 15% 13% 1% 
          
Total 1,063 100% 927 36% 41% 32% 13% 14% 0% 
Table 3.1 - Mutual Funds by Domicile Country and Region 
 
We find that, on average, funds based in the euro area invest more (less) in euro 
area (domestic or home) assets, when compared to non-euro area funds. There are 
similarities respecting the international allocation, i.e., the percentage allocated in assets 
based outside Europe is quite similar for the two groups. At the country level, we find 
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more differences across countries, indicating that the country where the fund is based 
impacts portfolio allocation decisions. 
 
3.2.2 Methodology 
As we aim to analyze the changes in the allocation strategy since the euro 
introduction, we perform a thorough analysis of the European holdings. We evaluate the 
role of a set of drivers to explain home bias and euro bias. We follow the methodology 
proposed by Thapa et al. (2013), but we propose a slightly different specification that 
allows us to identify the bias in European mutual funds holdings. 
Home bias and euro bias are defined taking into account the study of Thapa et al. 
(2013) but also the work from Baele et al. (2007), Chan et al. (2009), Baltzer et al. (2013) 
and Vermeulen (2013). The holdings benchmark references are given by the predictions 
of the ICAPM26. Investors should hold equities in each foreign country j equal to the 
relative market capitalization of country j on world market capitalization. Thus, the 
optimal weight of assets based in country j (𝑤𝑗) is given by:   
 
𝑤𝑗 =   
𝑀𝑉𝑗
∑ 𝑀𝑉
 (3.1) 
 
where 𝑀𝑉𝑗 is the market capitalization of country j and ∑ 𝑀𝑉 is the world market 
capitalization (obtained as the sum of the all the individual countries’ market 
capitalizations).  
In order to get the reference portfolio weights, we use the world index calculated 
by Thomson Reuters’ Datastream based on the regional market capitalizations. 
Datastream provides information about the portfolio weight for each individual stock in 
the index and the corresponding industry within a country. The benchmarks weights are 
calculated for the sixteen European countries included in the Thomson Reuters dataset. 
The industry benchmarks are computed accordingly. 
                                                          
26 ICAPM assumes full market integration. While we find this assumption does not hold in reality, we use 
nevertheless the world market portfolio as the reference portfolio. 
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We compute the actual and benchmark reference weights. Following previous 
studies, such as Baele et al. (2007), Pungulescu (2015) and Mishra (2015), we then 
compute, for each country, the home (HB) and the euro bias (EB) given by the difference 
between actual (𝐴𝐶𝑇) and benchmark (𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐶𝐻) foreign holdings weights as follows: 
 
𝐻(𝐸)𝐵 = 1 −  
𝐴𝐶𝑇
𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐶𝐻
  (3.2) 
 
Foreign is defined as non-domestic assets for HB and non-euro assets for EB. 
In most cases, the H(E)B measure ranges between 0 (no home bias), when the 
actual weight is equal to the optimal dictated by the ICAPM reference, and 1 when the 
portfolio has no foreign holdings (only domestic stocks, i.e., the most extreme home bias). 
When ACT allocation is superior to the BENCH a negative value is obtained, meaning 
an overinvestment abroad. 
When the fund is based in a country within the euro area, the EB measure also 
includes the holdings allocated to the domestic stocks, capturing the effect of home bias. 
We also computed the EB measure excluding the domestic stocks holdings. Tables 3.3-
3.6, report the differences between actual and reference holdings (𝐴𝐶𝑇 - 𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐶𝐻), 
allowing a more intuitive understanding of the home bias and the euro bias.  
 
3.2.3 Model Specification and Variables Definition  
To identify the main drivers of the home bias and the euro bias, we use a model 
that allows us to test not only what impacts more on the allocation deviations, but also to 
understand if the bias was specially impacted by the euro introduction and/or by the 
financial crisis. We also control for the mutual fund location. 
In the model of Thapa et al. (2013) the dependent variable is the actual portfolio 
weight of home assets (𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖) and the benchmark portfolio weight is included as an 
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independent variable. Given that we want to explain the home (euro) bias, our dependent 
variable is the H(E)B measure27. Our specification model is given by: 
 
 
𝐻𝐵𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝐸𝐵𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑉𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑃𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝐷𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑂𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐷𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐷𝐸𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽12𝐷𝑃𝐼𝐺𝑆𝑖
+ 𝛽13𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑋𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽14𝑉𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑋 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽15𝑉𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑋 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
 
 
We consider two dummy variables to evaluate, respectively, the impact of the euro 
introduction and a possible bias that results from belonging or not to the euro area.  
Table 3.2 resumes the variables included in our specification model.  
 
Variable  Source Description 
Exchange rate risk VFOREX 
Bank for International 
Settlements 
Standard deviation of the effective exchange rate 
Degree of financial 
liberalization 
RESTRIC 
Economic Freedom 
Network 
Capital control measure, 0 (closed) - 10 (fully open) 
Degree of openness OPEN World Bank Sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP 
Gross domestic product GDP World Bank Log of GDP 
Market capitalization MKTCAP Datastream Log of domestic market capitalization 
Average local market 
return 
RLOCAL Datastream 
3-year moving average of domestic equity market 
returns 
Average local market 
volatility 
VOL Datastream 
3-year moving average of standard deviation 
domestic equity market 
Diversification Potential DIVPOT Datastream 
Ratio between domestic and Europe stock market 
volatilities 
Dummy Euro 
introduction 
DEURO - 1 – 1997 to 2001; 0 – other wise 
Dummy Crisis DCRISIS - 1 – 2007 to 2009; 0 – other wise 
Dummy Euro Area DEA - 
1 – countries based inside euro area; 0 – other 
countries 
Dummy PIGS DPIGS - 
1 – Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain; 0 – other 
countries 
Euronext platform EURONEXT - 1 – Stock market belongs to Euronext; 0 – other wise 
Table 3.2 - Variable Definition 
                                                          
27 However, in order to check the robustness of our change, we have also run a specification similar to 
one originally proposed by Thapa et al. (2013). 
(3.3) 
  
58 
 
The first independent variable (VFOREX) is the exchange rate risk which is 
expected to have a positive relationship to the home (euro) bias. Following Carrieri et al. 
(2006) we proxy forex risk with the standard deviation of the rolling 36 monthly 
observations of the effective exchange rate obtained from the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS)28.  
In order to capture the degree of financial liberalization, we use the capital control 
intensity measure from the Economic Freedom Network (RESTRIC), also used by Chan 
et al. (2005). The variable ranges between 0 and 10, where 10 corresponds to a fully open 
market to foreign investments.  
We also included the degree of openness of the economy (OPEN), following 
Mishra (2015), measured by the ratio of (Exports+Imports) to Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). We obtained this data from the World Bank.  
To capture the economic development, we use the log of GDP (GDP) also 
obtained from the World Bank. To proxy the development of the equity market, we use 
the log of market capitalization (MKTCAP) obtained from Thomson Reuters’ 
Datastream. 
In order to capture the effect of market conditions on investment decisions, we 
consider the 3-year moving average of the domestic market return (RLOCAL) and 
domestic equity market return volatility (VOL) also measured by a 3-year moving 
average of the standard deviation of the stock market returns. This data was obtained from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream.   
Another important driver of investment in foreign assets is the potential 
diversification abroad when compared to the domestic investment opportunity set. 
Following the guidance of MSCI (2015) we use, as proxy of diversification opportunities, 
the measure Diversification Potential (DIVPOT), which is given by the ratio between the 
domestic volatility and the volatility of an European index. The ratio captures the 
volatility reduction that is achievable by investing in a diversified portfolio of European 
stocks instead of only holding domestic stocks. The volatility measures refer, 
respectively, to the MSCI domestic and the MSCI Europe indices. The data was obtained 
from Datastream. 
                                                          
28 Previous studies, in other to access exchange rate risk, also presented other proxy alternatives, e.g., the 
value at risk (VaR) model (Papaioannou, 2006). 
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To capture time and location effects, we use five different dummy variables. The 
first one is a dummy to capture the effect of the euro introduction (DEURO). It takes the 
value 1 between 1997 and 2001 and 0 otherwise. The second one is a dummy also used 
by Thapa et al. (2013) that captures the effect of the financial crisis that started in 2007 
(DCRISIS). It takes the value 1 for the period between 2007 and 2009 and 0 otherwise.  
The third is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the fund is domiciled in a country 
that belongs to the euro area and 0 otherwise (DEA). The fourth dummy refers to a group 
of countries that were more affected by the recent financial crisis, inside the euro area: 
Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain. The dummy (DPIGS) takes the value of 1 if the country 
is Portugal or Italy or Greece or Spain and 0 otherwise. 
The last dummy tries to capture the effect of common trading platforms 
(EURONEXT).  It takes the value of 1 if the fund operates in a country whose domestic 
stock market belongs to the Euronext group and 0 otherwise. 
Lastly, considering that the introduction of the euro caused by structural changes, 
as mentioned in the previous literature, we enhance our model adding two interaction 
terms. The first is the interaction between the variables VFOREX and DEURO to account 
for the fact that the effects of the volatility of the exchange rate may have changed after 
the euro introduction. Additionally, we include an interaction variable between RESTRIC 
and DCRISIS as the financial crisis may have had a different impact depending on the 
degree of financial liberalization, meaning that funds based in countries with less 
financial liberalization, and therefore with lower spillover effects, may have been less 
affected. 
 
3.3 Preliminary Results 
3.3.1 Summary Statistics 
As mentioned before, in Section 3.2.2, for a more intuitive understanding of the 
bias, we show the direct difference between actual and optimal weights (𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖 - 𝐵𝐸𝑁𝐶𝐻𝑖). 
Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 show the summary statistics for, respectively, the variables 
DIFHOME, DIFEURO AREA, DIFEURO AREA EXCL. HOME. Table 3.6 shows the 
summary statistics for the financial stocks (DIFFINANCIALS). 
As already shown in Table 3.1, there are wide differences across countries in terms 
of the percentage that funds invest in home assets. The difference between the actual 
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weights in home assets and the respective theoretical levels differs across countries as 
shown in Table 3.3. Standard deviation figures show that even for the funds domiciled in 
the same country there are substantial differences in the allocation strategy in what 
regards home and non-home assets, also reinforced by the gap between mean and median. 
Differences could be partially explained by the fact that funds included in our sample 
have distinct strategies, objectives, or even investment charter restrictions.  
Finally, while the overinvestment in home assets is in line with the previous 
literature, it is higher for funds based outside the euro area. This may reflect the effect 
reported by Balli et al. (2010), a switch of home bias to euro bias in the funds based within 
the euro area, caused by the euro introduction that was not observed for funds based 
outside the euro area.  
Median figures are below the mean suggesting that there are outlier funds in every 
country (except for Greece) overinvesting heavily in home assets.  
 
Country  
(fund domicile) 
Mean Median Std. Deviation Kurtosis Skewness 
Austria 13.9% 0.9% 30.9% 3.37 2.27 
Belgium 10.3% 1.9% 23.3% 7.46 2.94 
Denmark 17.0% 0.1% 34.7% 1.16 1.75 
Finland 41.0% 17.8% 42.6% (1.77) 0.28 
France 40.6% 36.3% 37.7% (1.58) 0.14 
Germany 26.9% 13.3% 32.9% (0.08) 1.14 
Greece 84.0% 96.4% 30.5% 3.02 (2.18) 
Ireland 3.1% -0.1% 14.7% 35.05 6.02 
Italy 35.9% 11.7% 40.6% (1.47) 0.61 
Luxembourg 5.2% -0.1% 18.5% 15.10 4.03 
Netherlands 16.4% 3.1% 30.3% 2.12 1.93 
Portugal 33.5% 8.3% 42.2% (1.24) 0.78 
Spain 50.7% 48.0% 39.2% (1.73) (0.01) 
Sweden 45.9% 45.3% 32.5% (1.24) (0.02) 
Switzerland 4.0% 0.0% 10.4% 11.95 2.95 
UK 34.8% 17.3% 41.1% (1.58) 0.41 
      
Region Mean Median Std. Deviation Kurtosis Skewness 
Euro Area 30.5% 8.2% 39.0% (1.02) 0.86 
Non Euro Area (Europe) 34.7% 18.1% 39.9% (1.52) 0.43 
      
Total 32.5% 11.8% 39.5% (1.30) 0.65 
Table 3.3 - DIFHOME (Actual minus Benchmark domestic holdings) by Fund Domicile Country 
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Table 3.4 reinforces the findings of Balli et al. (2010). Funds based inside the euro 
area are biased towards euro area assets. On average, the difference between actual 
holdings and reference holdings is more than 40 percentage points (pp) and this also the 
case for the median fund (almost 45 pp). For funds based outside the euro area, the mean 
suggests over investment in euro area assets, yet the median is negative, reflecting 
differences across funds. However, as shown in Table 3.5, the large exposure to euro area 
assets is mainly caused by domestic holdings, reducing the difference from the theoretical 
values from more than 40 pp to slight above 10 pp. If for funds based in France or 
Germany that exposure could be justified by the size of their domestic markets, for funds 
in countries like Portugal and Spain there must be other factors that justify the 
overinvestment in the local market.     
 
Country 
(fund domicile) 
Mean Median Std. Deviation Kurtosis Skewness 
Austria 26.1% 23.3% 35.1% (1.15) 0.41 
Belgium 38.3% 39.2% 34.1% (1.18) (0.18) 
Denmark 7.8% -3.2% 28.6% 0.74 1.29 
Finland 45.8% 53.6% 34.8% (1.01) (0.61) 
France 48.6% 63.3% 38.6% (1.14) (0.66) 
Germany 38.9% 39.9% 36.0% (1.37) (0.13) 
Greece 73.7% 81.6% 22.8% 6.45 (2.75) 
Ireland 18.0% 19.0% 31.1% (0.97) 0.40 
Italy 47.7% 56.3% 36.6% (1.25) (0.48) 
Luxembourg 24.9% 18.7% 32.5% (0.71) 0.55 
Netherlands 30.1% 13.5% 36.1% (1.37) 0.43 
Portugal 52.8% 73.0% 38.2% (0.80) (0.90) 
Spain 64.8% 80.1% 25.8% 1.10 (1.38) 
Sweden 0.1% -5.6% 18.0% 3.17 1.87 
Switzerland 14.6% 21.2% 24.7% (1.76) (0.06) 
UK 6.5% -9.7% 29.3% 0.11 1.17 
      
Region Mean Median Std. Deviation Kurtosis Skewness 
Euro Area 42.4% 44.9% 37.3% (1.40) (0.30) 
Non Euro Area (Europe) 5.7% -7.2% 27.9% 0.47 1.27 
      
Total 24.9% 14.6% 37.8% (1.39) 0.39 
Table 3.4 - DIFEUROAREA (Actual minus Benchmark Euro area holdings) by Domicile Country 
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Country 
(fund domicile) 
Mean Median Std. Deviation Kurtosis Skewness 
Austria 11.9% 2.3% 28.7% (0.27) 0.84 
Belgium 27.4% 32.3% 31.1% (1.06) 0.15 
Denmark 7.8% -3.2% 28.6% 0.74 1.29 
Finland 4.1% -14.1% 28.9% 0.16 1.21 
France 3.1% -5.0% 21.2% 0.49 1.19 
Germany 8.3% 0.1% 23.5% (0.51) 0.76 
Greece -10.6% -14.7% 14.2% 17.04 4.09 
Ireland 14.8% 11.3% 29.3% (0.86) 0.47 
Italy 10.1% -3.1% 28.5% (0.29) 0.96 
Luxembourg 19.6% 15.6% 30.7% (0.19) 0.80 
Netherlands 12.0% 0.7% 29.0% 0.42 1.24 
Portugal 19.2% 6.9% 36.3% (1.39) 0.43 
Spain 12.5% 1.9% 27.7% (0.64) 0.76 
Sweden 0.1% -5.6% 18.0% 3.17 1.87 
Switzerland 14.6% 21.2% 24.7% (1.76) (0.06) 
UK 6.5% -9.7% 29.3% 0.11 1.17 
      
Region Mean Median Std. Deviation Kurtosis Skewness 
Euro Area 10.1% -1.1% 28.3% (0.19) 0.94 
Non Euro Area (Europe) 5.7% -7.2% 27.9% 0.47 1.27 
      
Total 8.0% -4.3% 28.2% 0.07 1.09 
Table 3.5 - DIFEURO AREA EXCL. HOME (Actual minus Benchmark euro area holdings excluding 
Home) by Domicile Country 
 
Regarding industry differences, we do not report all results here to save space, but 
they are available upon request. Overall, the difference between actual and reference 
allocations are lower.  
Funds based within the euro area focus more on utility and financial industries 
and funds based in other European countries, outside the euro area, invest more in health 
and consumer industries reinforcing once again the idea that the location of the fund may 
affect the portfolio allocation strategy. 
Table 3.6 shows the summary statistics for the financial industry. Funds based in 
Ireland display weights very close to the reference while for funds based in Greece, the 
difference is close to 7 pp. On a regional basis we find that the funds based within the 
euro area, on average, overinvest in financial stocks, while other European funds, outside 
euro area, underinvest in those stocks. Once again, the median figures show for both an 
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underinvestment, reinforcing the high level of discrepancy even inside the same 
region/country. 
 
Country 
(fund domicile) 
Mean Median Std. Deviation Kurtosis Skewness 
Austria 6.5% 0.6% 22.0% 3.25 1.93 
Belgium 3.6% -1.2% 19.5% 4.07 2.04 
Denmark -3.5% -4.5% 14.3% 19.59 3.90 
Finland -6.8% -10.3% 17.0% 6.68 2.55 
France 6.2% -1.4% 23.0% 2.31 1.76 
Germany -3.4% -4.2% 14.3% 11.18 2.50 
Greece 7.4% 6.6% 13.9% (0.07) 0.36 
Ireland 0.7% -1.2% 12.4% 0.69 0.77 
Italy 2.4% 0.7% 9.0% (0.29) 0.30 
Luxembourg -7.4% -6.5% 15.6% 9.35 2.07 
Netherlands 3.9% -1.7% 24.5% 1.89 1.58 
Portugal 3.5% -2.6% 24.0% 3.21 1.98 
Spain 3.9% -1.7% 24.5% 1.89 1.58 
Sweden -4.3% -3.5% 6.4% 2.00 (0.69) 
Switzerland -4.3% -3.5% 6.4% 2.00 (0.69) 
UK -3.7% -4.0% 9.8% 18.35 2.74 
      
Region Mean Median Std. Deviation Kurtosis Skewness 
Euro Area 1.3% -1.9% 19.0% 5.02 2.02 
Non Euro Area (Europe) -3.7% -3.9% 10.0% 20.87 3.04 
      
Total -0.9% -3.0% 15.9% 8.82 2.51 
Table 3.6 - DIFFINANCIALS (Actual minus Benchmark Financial stocks holdings) by Domicile Country 
 
In order to determine if the bias for funds belonging or not to the euro area and 
belonging or not to Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain is statistically different, we perform 
a t-test for the mean differences between different location and industry subsamples.  
Table 3.7 shows the results. The t-test indicates that the means are different, 
significant at 1% level.  
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ACT-BENCH Test Mean Difference p-value 
DIFHOME Euro Area vs. Non Euro Area funds -4.20% 0.000 
DIFEURO AREA Euro Area vs. Non Euro Area funds 36.66% 0.000 
DIFEUROPE29 Euro Area vs. Non Euro Area funds -33.63% 0.000 
    
DIFHOME PIGS vs. Non PIGS funds 22.12% 0.000 
DIFEURO AREA PIGS vs. Non PIGS funds 41.62% 0.000 
DIFEUROPE27 PIGS vs. Non PIGS funds -27.07% 0.000 
Table 3.7 - Location Effects (Actual minus Benchmark holdings) 
 
We also perform the same test for the industry subsamples. Table 3.8 shows the 
results for the financial holdings (results not fully reported, but available upon request). 
As expected, the differences between groups are smaller but significant at 1% level. 
 
ACT-BENCH Test Mean Difference p-value 
DIFFINANCIALS Euro Area vs. Non Euro Area funds 4.96% 0.000 
    
DIFFINANCIALS PIGS vs. Non PIGS funds 5.73% 0.000 
Table 3.8 - Industry Effects (Actual minus Benchmark holdings) 
 
Table 3.9 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the parameters associated with 
the variables included in the home (euro) bias model. 
  
                                                          
29 Actual minus Benchmark European holdings excluding Euro Area stocks holdings. 
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Variables Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skewness 
VFOREX 2.99 2.21 0.42 11.42 2.50 1.92 6.12 
RESTRIC 7.48 7.65 5.37 8.60 0.76 -1.19 3.66 
OPEN 0.67 0.55 0.03 3.56 0.45 3.55 18.94 
GDP 5.00 5.52 2.74 5.98 0.95 -1.46 3.92 
MKTCAP 11.87 12.10 10.35 12.59 0.61 -0.84 -0.73 
RLOCAL 0.02 0.01 -0.10 0.16 0.03 0.34 3.29 
VOL 0.10 0.09 0.02 0.31 0.05 0.82 4.17 
DIVPOT 1.10 1.00 0.51 6.37 0.43 1.79 12.61 
Table 3.9 - Summary Statistics 
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3.3.2 Correlation 
Table 3.10 shows the correlation matrix for the independent variables used in the empirical model. The results show that correlation 
coefficients between variables are not very high suggesting that multicollinearity is not an issue. Yet some additional tests have been 
performed in order to ensure that multicollinearity does not affect the results. These tests are presented later in the robustness section.     
 
 
 
VFOREX RESTRIC OPEN GDP MKTCAP RLOCAL VOL DIVPOT DEURO DCRISIS DEA DPIGS EURONEXT 
VFOREX  1             
RESTRIC  -0.13 1            
OPEN  -0.27 0.00 1           
GDP  0.28 0.11 -0.22 1          
MKTCAP  -0.12 -0.00 -0.07 -0.19 1         
RLOCAL  -0.01 -0.44 0.01 0.01 0.02 1        
VOL  -0.34 0.05 0.19 -0.31 -0.09 -0.42 1       
DIVPOT  -0.27 -0.38 0.16 -0.34 -0.05 0.21 0.56 1      
DEURO  0.12 -0.65 -0.12 -0.02 0.13 0.57 -0.11 0.27 1     
DCRISIS  0.06 0.14 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.22 -0.43 -0.14 -0.33 1    
DEA  -0.52 -0.22 0.29 -0.63 0.12 -0.01 0.42 0.47 -0.05 0.04 1   
DPIGS  -0.24 -0.21 -0.11 0.01 -0.04 0.05 0.14 0.19 -0.02 0.01 0.39 1  
EURONEXT  0.32 0.16 -0.21 0.49 0.24 -0.07 -0.47 0.54 0.01 -0.01 -0.46 -0.18 1 
Table 3.10 - Correlation Matrix 
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As expected, we get a negative relation between the euro introduction and the capital 
control intensity measure and a negative relation between the proxy for exchange rate risk 
and the dummy associated with funds belonging to the euro area.  
 
3.4 Empirical Results and Analysis  
 
In this Section, we present the empirical results of the regressions for HB and EB 
models. 
 
3.4.1 Home Bias 
Since we have observations for a sample of European mutual funds based in 
sixteen different countries over a period from June 1997 to June 2011, we used the EGLS 
panel regression technique with cross-section weights30. The estimation of a feasible GLS 
specification is advantageous since estimations are robust in case of the presence of 
heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation. In order to understand the impact of belonging or 
not to the euro area we also run the regression for two subsamples: (i) funds based in 
countries that belong to the euro area (EA) and (ii) funds based in other European 
countries but outside the euro area (NEA). 
Table 3.11 shows the results. Overall, we have a high level of statistical 
significance for the variables included in the model and a reasonable quality of 
adjustment.  
 
 Home Bias 
 Total EA NEA 
Intercept 0.750*** 0.724*** -3.616*** 
VFOREX 0.005*** 0.002 0.008*** 
RESTRIC -0.047*** -0.065*** -0.005 
OPEN -0.078*** -0.073*** 0.069** 
                                                          
30 EGLS application with cross-section weights is supported by the result of the Hausman test which 
shows that random effects should not be used. 
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 Home Bias 
 Total EA NEA 
GDP -0.025*** -0.027*** 0.678*** 
MKTCAP -0.002*** -0.005*** 0.003*** 
RLOCAL 0.941*** 1.041*** 0.078 
VOL 0.731*** 0.886*** -0.148 
DIVPOT 0.030*** 0.019*** 0.029*** 
DEURO -0.030*** -0.112*** 0.034*** 
DCRISIS 1.009*** 0.881*** 0.422*** 
DEA -0.198*** - - 
DPIGS 0.336*** 0.348*** - 
EURONEXT 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.122*** 
VFOREX*DEURO -0.014*** 0.021*** -0.007*** 
RESTRIC*DCRISIS -0.130*** -0.114*** -0.059*** 
    
Adjusted R-squared 41.33% 40.21% 20.65% 
N. of Observations 45,785 23,898 21,887 
  ***significant at 1% level 
  **significant at 5% level 
  *significant at 10% level 
Table 3.11 - Home Bias Results (Model 3.3) 
 
Considering the location impact, our model shows that for funds based within the 
euro area, the home bias is on average, 0.198 points lower than for funds based outside 
the euro area. Yet, for funds based in Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain the results are 
different: the bias is 0.336 higher. These findings suggest different levels of financial 
integration, not only outside but even inside the euro area.  
As expected, we find a positive impact of the euro introduction in the reduction of 
the home bias. That effect could be partly explained by the elimination of exchange rate 
risk, the creation of common platforms and the removal of restrictions on capital flows, 
noticed for those that belong to the euro area and confirmed by the effect of the proxies 
used (DEURO and VFOREX*DEURO). On the other hand, we find, as expected, an 
increase of the home bias driven by the recent financial crisis. That impact could be 
justified by the increase of correlation between euro area assets decreasing the 
diversification incentives to invest abroad.  
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However, this effect is not clear, investors do not seem to benefit from the 
potential diversification by investing in a diversified portfolio of European stocks, 
maintaining a considerable level of home bias. 
Additionally, we also find that a higher level of development and higher degree 
of openness of the economy are associated with lower levels of home bias. Those findings 
are in line with previous literature that states that a higher degree of openness leads to an 
increase of information reducing the risks of foreign investments. We also observe a 
significant and higher coefficient of the RLOCAL variable, suggesting positive recent 
returns of the domestic markets are associated with higher levels of home bias. 
Also curious and worth to highlight is the positive reaction to domestic equity 
market return volatility. If positive return of domestic markets increases the level of home 
bias, volatility of those markets should have a negative impact, yet not verified. This 
result could be driven by the false sensation of protection when investing in more well-
known stocks.  
Finally, when looking at the results of the subsamples, we find that funds based in 
countries outside the euro area, increased the levels of home bias after the euro 
introduction. That impact could be justified by the less diversification opportunities inside 
the euro area. If the potential of diversification decreases, the transaction costs may not 
justify investing abroad. Additionally, the level of home bias for investors based outside 
the euro area do not seem to be sensitive to returns of the domestic markets, so for those 
investors, other drivers seem to be more relevant in allocation selection.  
 
3.4.2 Euro Bias 
In Table 3.12 we present the results for the euro bias model. The first aspect worth 
highlighting is a significant increase of quality of adjustment. 
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Euro Bias 
 Total EA NEA 
Intercept 0.029* 0.624*** 0.970*** 
VFOREX 0.001*** 0.05*** 0.002*** 
RESTRIC -0.001 -0.026*** 0.010*** 
OPEN -0.059*** -0.064*** 0.079*** 
GDP -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.199*** 
MKTCAP -0.001*** -0.003*** 0.001** 
RLOCAL 0.509*** 0.781*** 0.059 
VOL 0.387*** 0.671*** 0.065 
DIVPOT 0.016*** 0.011** 0.007 
DEURO 0.011*** -0.075*** 0.007 
DCRISIS 0.290*** 0.606*** 0.081 
DEA 0.433*** - - 
DPIGS 0.372*** 0.360*** - 
EURONEXT 0.056*** 0.064*** 0.010 
VFOREX*DEURO -0.004*** 0.024*** -0.001 
RESTRIC*DCRISIS -0.038** -0.080*** -0.012 
    
Adjusted R-squared 72.22% 43.53% 3.55% 
N. of Observations 45,785 23,898 21,887 
  ***significant at 1% level 
  **significant at 5% level 
  *significant at 10% level 
Table 3.12 - Euro Bias Results (Model 3.3) 
 
From a location perspective, our results are also in line with the previous literature 
that states an increased preference for euro area assets, especially for funds based in 
countries within the euro area. Our model shows that funds based in countries within the 
euro area have a 0.433 higher degree of euro bias. Additionally, in line with our findings 
for home bias, funds based in Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain have even more over 
preference for euro assets which is directly translated in higher degree of euro bias. The 
impact of common platforms is also positive and statistically significant. 
When looking at the subsamples regression estimates, we find that the 
phenomenon of euro bias is a characteristic of funds based in countries within the euro 
area. For funds based in countries outside the euro area, we find a low quality of 
adjustment and some parameters are not statistically significant. For funds based in 
countries within the euro area, we find a slight reduction of euro bias, driven by the euro 
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introduction, which we did not expect. The shift from home to euro bias, described by 
previous literature, should not be an one off consequence of the euro introduction but a 
longer term effect caused not only by the elimination of exchange rate risk but also 
because of other effects such as the introduction of common trading platforms.  
Finally, we notice that like the home bias, exposure to euro assets could indeed be 
justified by recent positive performance of home returns or its volatility or even by an 
increase in the benefits of diversification proved by the coefficient of the DIVPOT 
variable. While we are using euro bias as proxy for financial market integration it is 
important to understand that this is an indirect measure and holdings over time may reflect 
other factors, such as market conditions.  
 
3.4.3 Industry Analysis 
Industry holdings analysis is performed for the period between 4Q07 and 2Q11, 
so limited to the most recent period, around the financial crisis. 
As already mentioned in Section 3.3.1, the industry allocation of the European 
investment funds seems to be more aligned with the ICAPM allocation reference.  
Although immaterial, some biases are still worth to highlight. Overall, we find 
overinvestment in industries like health care and consumer and underinvestment in 
industries like technology and industrials. Comparing funds based in countries within the 
euro area with funds based in other European countries, we find that funds based outside 
the euro area overinvest in health care and consumer industries. On the other hand, funds 
based within the euro area overinvest in financial and utilities industries. This allocation 
could reflect geographical preferences (if the respective domestic markets are more 
exposed to those industries) but the other way around is also plausible (if funds want to 
get exposure to some industries, they may need to invest in some particular markets).   
Funds based in Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain on one side, show a higher 
exposure to financial holdings, especially funds based in Greece, but on the other hand 
there seems to be a more accentuated reduction in these exposures with the beginning of 
the financial crisis. While, as mentioned, the overall deviation from the ICAPM allocation 
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reference level is trivial. Funds based in Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain show over 
exposure to the financial industry, which has not changed, even after the shock of the 
financial crisis. Excluding Italy, the other countries continue to show an over exposure 
again to the financial industry especially after mid-2010.  
This overexposure to the financial industry could merely reflect the weight of 
these industries in the domestic markets of these countries and the fact that they display 
high levels of home bias.  
The previous literature that has analyzed euro area financial integration in the 
period of the financial crisis, such as Inklaar et al. (2012), Pungulescu (2013), Bekaert et 
al. (2013) and Gibson et al. (2014), is not consensual in terms of the impact of the financial 
crisis on financial integration.  
Generally, our results indicate a higher level of euro bias after the financial crisis 
suggesting that the crisis led to an intensification of the integration inside the euro area, 
reinforcing thus the conclusions presented in chapter two. 
 
3.4.4 Robustness Tests 
In order to assess the robustness of our results, we perform additional tests. To 
evaluate whether the large number of the UK funds in our dataset could be driving the 
results, we run all models excluding all funds based in the UK. The results are available 
upon request. Overall, we get the same conclusions. 
Given that this study is a follow up on the work reported on chapter 2. Results, 
using a return-based approach, suggest an intensification of the financial integration 
following the euro introduction; and a negative impact initiated just before the financial 
crisis and different behavior for funds domiciled in different locations suggesting partial 
financial segmentation. We perform a comparative test in order to check if those results 
held using a holdings-based approach. Since we used two different datasets, we select a 
subsample of the current dataset with funds included in the dataset used in Chapter 2. That 
sample included funds that invested in Europe and mainly (more than 70%) inside the 
euro area. Applying the same restrictions to the current dataset we reduce the number of 
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funds from 1,062 to only 147. Results, using the same methodology31 are displayed on 
Table 3.13.  
For the both specifications, we observe an increase of the adjusted R2. However, 
funds that allocate their wealth only in Europe (mostly in euro area) show different 
reaction to a few drivers. For the home bias model, this specific sub group does not show 
a statistically significant reaction to the introduction of the euro and to the financial crisis. 
However, for the euro bias model, we find a stronger effect associated with the 
introduction of the euro. Overall, the test allows us to reinforce that within Europe there 
are different levels of financial integration. 
 
 Home Bias  Euro Bias 
 Total 147 Funds  Total 147 Funds 
Intercept 0.750*** 0.292***  0.029* 0.384*** 
VFOREX 0.005*** -0.003***  0.001*** 0.003*** 
RESTRIC -0.047*** 0.06***  -0.001 0.011*** 
OPEN -0.078*** -0.074***  -0.059*** -0.003*** 
GDP -0.025*** 0.001  -0.014*** -0.001** 
MKTCAP -0.002*** 0.004***  -0.001*** 0.001*** 
RLOCAL 0.941*** 0.190***  0.509*** -0.271*** 
VOL 0.731*** -0.434***  0.387*** -0.003 
DIVPOT 0.030*** -0.016***  0.016*** -0.022*** 
DEURO -0.030*** 0.016  0.011*** 0.049*** 
DCRISIS 1.009*** 0.407  0.290*** 0.040*** 
DEA -0.198*** -0.145***  0.433*** -0.002*** 
DPIGS 0.336*** -0.080***  0.372*** 0.004*** 
EURONEXT 0.013*** -0.027***  0.056*** 0.001 
VFOREX*DEURO -0.014*** 0.003***  -0.004*** -0.001 
RESTRIC*DCRISIS -0.130*** -0.056***  -0.038** -0.011*** 
      
Adjusted 
R-squared 
41.33% 93.12%  72.22% 77.54% 
N. of Observations 45,785 5,834  45,785 5,834 
  ***significant at 1% level 
  **significant at 5% level 
  *significant at 10% level 
Table 3.13 - Robustness Test 
                                                          
31 Given that these funds only invest in Europe, we consider an European index calculated by Thomson 
Reuters’ Datastream instead of the world index, to calculate the benchmark holdings. 
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Finally, as mentioned in Section 3.3.2, in order to avoid any possible doubt of bias 
resultant from multicollinearity, we rerun our model excluding the variables with 
correlation coefficient above 0.5, such as the DEURO and DEA. The results, available 
upon request, are robust and thus not affected by any multicollinearity. 
 
3.5 Summary and Main Conclusions 
This chapter is a follow up to the analysis presented in chapter 2. We analyze the 
portfolio holdings of a sample of European mutual funds to assess the impact of euro 
introduction and of the 2007-08 financial crisis. By examining directly the impact of these 
important events on portfolio weights we aim at indirectly assessing how the level of 
financial integration has changed over time, looking at home and euro bias.  
We test an empirical specification, based on the arguments that have been put 
forward to account for home bias.  
Our findings show that funds based in countries within the euro area have lower 
home bias, suggesting a higher level of financial integration inside the area. Moreover, 
we find that the decrease in the levels of home bias occurs along with the introduction of 
the euro. That finding is also validated by a higher degree of euro bias, which means that 
euro area investors seem to behave as euro area investors, especially after the euro 
introduction. This evidence is consistent with the “local bias” phenomenon identified by 
previous studies. 
Yet, we find different behaviors even within the euro area. Funds based in 
Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain exhibit excess investment in domestic assets suggesting 
different levels of financial integration in countries within the euro area.  
At the industry level, the level of bias is smaller. Yet, funds based outside the euro 
area show an over preference for non-tradable industries which along with a higher level 
of home bias, suggest a lower level of financial integration.  
We find that along with a smooth increase of home bias, the financial crisis also leads to 
adjustments in the portfolio allocation, increasing investment in industries like health care 
and energy and a reduction in financial stocks and stocks in industries more directly 
linked to the economic cycle.  
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4. THE CORPORATE OWNERSHIP LEVEL OF 
EUROPEAN INVESTMENTS FUNDS AND 
FINANCIAL MARKET INTEGRATION 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The empirical phenomenon of preference for domestic equities (Home Bias), well 
above the level that could be justified by portfolio theory, has puzzled academics for 
decades (Cooper et al., 2013). Most of the previous studies that examine Home Bias (HB) 
focus on the relative weight of domestic/foreign portfolio holdings on total holdings but 
disregard the strength of that investment in terms of ownership. Different theoretical 
arguments, such as the Corporate Insider Theory, may provide additional insights on 
financial integration exploring differences in domestic/foreign ownership levels (Stulz, 
2005, Kho et al., 2009, Lozano et al., 2016). 
The ownership perspective brings about a new set of arguments that may help to 
explain the excessive preference for domestic assets. To start with, investors only buy 
non-domestic assets if they are available to trade, so free float and liquidity may have an 
important impact on the investor’s decision. This is related to ownership concentration. 
For example, in many European countries, companies are controlled by one single family 
resulting thus in reduced free float (Lozano et al., 2016, Kho et al., 2009). Companies that 
have a major shareholder that often has control of the company may deter corporate 
foreign ownership, in particular, by institutional investors. Arguments related to agency 
issues and expropriation risk must thus be considered (Stulz, 2005, Germanova et al., 
2015). There may be conflict of interests between the controlling and other shareholders 
that could be more pronounced in countries with poor protection of minority shareholders 
given than controlling shareholders could extract private benefits, maximizing their own 
welfare rather than the welfare of all shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999, Stulz, 2005)32. 
In extreme types of ownership, such as family-owned businesses, independent directors 
                                                          
32 Previous studies show that minority shareholders are typically more protected in countries of common 
law and with a stronger corporate governance mechanism (Lozano et al., 2016). 
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and effective protection of minority rights are even more necessary to minimize the 
conflict of interests (Germanova et al., 2015).  
Despite all the limitations to invest abroad and the persistent over preference for 
domestic assets, the allocation in foreign assets increased over the last decades as 
documented in chapter one. Gal (2015), for example, analyses the spatial features of the 
financial markets, considering primarily the increasing globalization and the development 
of the euro area’s financial markets. The author shows that, despite the predominance of 
domestic markets, portfolio allocation in foreign assets increased from 5% in 1980 to 20% 
in the mid-2000. Yet, this level of allocation abroad is extremely heterogeneous across 
countries (Wojcik, 2002).  
Shareholders are typically divided into two segments: institutional investors and 
retail investors, however when the focus is the motivation for cross-border ownership, 
previous literature divides shareholders in financial33 and non-financial investors  
(Wojcik, 2002, La Porta et al., 1999, Stulz, 2005). Wojcik (2002) states that financial 
institutions invest abroad in order to achieve the necessary international diversification 
and to reduce portfolio risk. This investment is usually made through foreign shares 
acquisition on secondary markets (Wojcik, 2002). On the other side, non-financial 
investors invest in foreign companies in order to have a lasting impact on the companies’ 
business and investment is many times made through merger and acquisition operations 
(Wojcik, 2002, Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2014, Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001).  
Controlling for the different characteristics and preferences of investors, in a full 
financial market integration, companies should display identical level of foreign 
ownership (Stulz, 2005). Lower levels of cross-border corporate ownership could thus 
reflect financial market segmentation (Gal, 2015). The corporate ownership structure 
could thus be informative about the level of financial market integration.  
Nevertheless, it is important to understand that several other factors, not directly 
related to the degree of financial market integration, influence and may justify the levels 
of foreign ownership. For example, agency problems could affect either home or foreign 
investments denoting that an institutional investor, who only invests in companies with 
                                                          
33 Financial institutions are, e.g., banks, insurance companies, pensions funds and mutual funds. 
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high corporate-governance standards, may be constrained to invest more or less in home 
or in foreign companies not because of the level of integration/segmentation but due to 
own preferences. Even if there are different behaviors by euro area and non-euro area 
funds that difference could merely reflect investor preferences. For example, if an 
institutional investor based in a common law country does not wish to deal with agency 
problems and prefers investing only in companies based in countries with common law 
regimes, he will allocate a huge part of his investment domestically when the alternatives 
are foreign stocks from family-owned companies located in a civil law country. Even 
institutional investors in the civil law countries may avoid buying domestic stocks given 
limited free float and risk of expropriation of those investments. The resulting ownership 
levels may thus not reflect financial market segmentation, per se, but may deter financial 
market integration given that risk sharing will be limited and pricing rules will therefore 
reflect that.  
The proportion of European mutual funds with foreign assets in their portfolio 
increased from 10% in 1975 to almost 50% in 2012 but major differences across European 
countries persist. Davydoff et al. (2013) reports that the proportion of funds investing 
abroad varies between 10% and 60%. Germanova et al. (2015) show that, by 2015, foreign 
investment in European companies is, on average, 22%.  
Previous studies evaluate portfolio holding and how investors have changed their 
exposure to domestic or foreign assets through time. We evaluate the ownership level of 
domestic/foreign companies over time. This evidence may help us understand if and to 
what extent the level of financial market integration has changed over the last decade. We 
look at European stocks ownership levels and focus on institutional investors34 which are 
nowadays the dominant shareholders in the world stock markets (Pool et al., 2012).  
We conduct an exploratory analysis using a dataset of mutual funds portfolio 
holdings from Thomson Reuters. This dataset covers 1,063 funds domiciled in 16 
different European countries, from 1997 to 2011, investing worldwide.  
                                                          
34 According to Investment Company Institute (2015) and the International Investment Funds Association 
(2016), by the end of 2016, there were almost 80.000 funds managing over USD 37 trillions of assets 
representing USD 16 trillion invested. 
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We analyze the portfolio holdings to understand how investors allocate their 
wealth and, specifically, their ownership preferences. We propose a model to assess the 
determinants of the ownership levels in domestic and foreign stocks through time across 
mutual funds.  
Our results confirm the expected correlation between the size of the portfolio and 
the ownership level. Additionally, we observe a rather constant level of domestic and 
cross-border ownership that was only barely affected by the great financial crisis.  
This latter finding could be justified by the relevant number of family-owned 
companies particularly in Europe. This feature may reduce the attractiveness for external 
and foreign investors due to the limited free float35, expropriation risk, especially in 
companies operating in countries with poor corporate governance standards.  
Overall, our findings seem to support imperfect financial market integration. We 
find that investors based inside the euro area show a constant lower level of ownership 
despite allocating the largest stake of their portfolios to euro area stocks. The different 
behavior between funds located inside the euro area and those in other European 
countries, outside the euro area, is underlined by the different responses to some of the 
main drivers of corporate ownership levels. Yet, not only some estimates are not in line 
with corporate insider theory implications but also there are regression estimates for 
subsamples that are inconsistent suggesting that our model specification is not able to 
properly capture the time-series and cross-sectional variability of corporate ownership of 
European investment funds. 
Therefore, one needs to stress that the ownership approach and, to some extent of 
the holdings approach is limited and an indirect measure of financial integration.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data 
and the empirical methodology we use to evaluate domestic and corporate ownership 
levels over time and across funds domiciled in different European countries. Section 3 
presents the main results and Section 4 includes the main conclusions and final remarks. 
                                                          
35 Free float is the percentage of the available shares that are not held by controlling shareholders. 
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4.2 Data, Methodology and Variables 
4.2.1 Sample Description 
We use a Thomson Reuters dataset that comprises 1,063 investment funds. These 
investments funds are based in Europe, in 16 different countries36, without any limitation 
on their investment scope (geographic, style, industry). 56% of the funds in our sample 
are based inside the euro area.  
One important feature of the dataset is that it includes solely the equity holdings 
of the portfolio. The funds do not have any limitation to the type of financial assets that 
they could invest in. Given that these are equity funds, stocks represent most of its 
investments. Yet, these funds could shift their investment from equity to other kind of 
financial assets like bonds or derivatives or cash. The data set only includes information 
about the equity component.  
Portfolio holdings are available on a quarterly basis, for the period between June 
1997 and June 2011. For each fund, we have information about its investment style, level 
of turnover and domicile. Additionally, for each stock held, the dataset includes company 
and market information: headquarter of the company, the industry where it belongs, the 
shares outstanding, stock prices, number of shares held by the fund, and the correspondent 
percentage of ownership.  
Preliminary analysis of the 1,063 funds shows that some of these funds were 
highly concentrated on a few stocks with a high level of ownership37. For example, 35 
funds had at least one share that represented more than 20% of their TNA and 41 funds 
had an ownership percentage superior to 10% in only one company. In order to avoid that 
these outliers affect our results, we eliminated those funds that probably were not created 
for investment purposes but possibly for tax reasons. We used the following criteria: (i) 
we eliminated funds which had a stock that represented 20% of more of its TNA and, (ii) 
                                                          
36 The investment funds are based in: Austria; Belgium; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; 
Ireland; Italy; Luxembourg; Netherlands; Portugal; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland and United Kingdom 
(UK) 
37 Excluding these outliers, the portfolios of the mutual funds included in our dataset are reasonably 
diversified, investing in average in stocks based on around 40 different locations (with a small number 
showing an investment in almost two hundred stocks based in different locations).  
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we eliminated funds that had an ownership level superior to 10% in one single stock. The 
final sample includes a total of 834 funds.  
Based on the information available, for each holding we assess the amount 
invested on that stock and the correspondent ownership level. Considering the location of 
each holding, we cluster the observations into eleven groups. We calculate the amount 
invested and the correspondent weighted average ownership in stocks based in the country 
where the fund is registered (home stocks); in the euro area (euro area stocks excluding 
home and Germany); in Germany (Germany stocks); in the United Kingdom (UK); in 
other non-euro countries in Europe, excluding the UK; in the United States of America 
(US), Canada, America, Africa, Japan and Asia. All the eleven clusters are mutually 
exclusive, meaning that one holding is only considered in one cluster, i.e., a mutual fund 
based in Portugal, that invests only in Portuguese stocks, will have its holdings all 
classified as home stocks.  
As our study addresses financial market integration in the euro area, we consider 
two additional classifications: Home vs. Non-Home ownership and Euro vs. Non-Euro 
area ownership. 
Table 4.1 shows the distribution of funds by country. One third of funds are based 
in the United Kingdom (UK) and 56% of funds are based in four other European 
countries: the UK, Germany, Sweden and France. This high level of concentration is in 
line with figures reported by the European Fund and Asset Management Association 
(2016). France, Germany and the UK are the main European host countries for mutual 
funds. The sample reflects the size and development of these financial markets.  
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Country 
/Region 
Number 
of funds 
% 
TNA M€ 
[Average] 
%Home  
[Average] 
%Euro 
Area 
[Average] 
%Europe 
[Average] 
Ownership 
[Weighted 
Average] 
Home 
ownership  
[Weighted 
Average] 
Euro Area 
ownership38  
[Weighted 
Average] 
Europe 
ownership39  
[Weighted 
Average] 
UK 282 34% 1,027 33% 16% 8% 0.09% 0.09% 0.07% 0.07% 
Germany 107 13% 1,285 16% 18% 7% 0.07% 0.07% 0.05% 0.05% 
Sweden 51 6% 945 41% 12% 7% 0.07% 0.22% 0.06% 0.05% 
France 30 4% 1,000 35% 15% 7% 0.12% 0.10% 0.10% 0.08% 
Austria 44 5% 177 4% 22% 14% 0.05% 0.05% 0.06% 0.04% 
Portugal 26 3% 70 2% 24% 5% 0.09% 0.02% 0.08% 0.12% 
Netherlands 39 5% 965 10% 16% 7% 0.11% 0.13% 0.06% 0.05% 
Spain 32 4% 200 33% 28% 6% 0.03% 0.05% 0.03% 0.04% 
Denmark 41 5% 446 10% 13% 12% 0.06% 0.07% 0.04% 0.13% 
Finland 40 5% 182 47% 12% 10% 0.07% 0.08% 0.03% 0.05% 
Greece 32 4% 47 77% 5% 3% 0.09% 0.10% 0.09% 0.02% 
Ireland 34 4% 648 2% 24% 7% 0.06% 0.08% 0.04% 0.04% 
Belgium 26 3% 477 7% 36% 8% 0.04% 0.07% 0.07% 0.03% 
Luxembourg 25 3% 230 3% 23% 10% 0.04% 0.02% 0.03% 0.06% 
Italy 20 2% 333 16% 17% 19% 0.04% 0.02% 0.02% 0.05% 
Switzerland 5 1% 993 3% 15% 2% 0.08% 0.04% 0.08% 0.08% 
           
Euro Area 455 55% 662 16% 19% 7% 0.08% 0.08% 0.05% 0.05% 
Non Euro 
Area 
(Europe) 
379 45% 951 33% 15% 8% 0.08% 0.11% 0.07% 0.07% 
           
Total 834 100% 803 26% 17% 8% 0.08% 0.10% 0.06% 0.06% 
Table 4.1 - Mutual Funds by Domicile Country and Region 
 
The ownership level is very similar across all the geographies considered. At a 
country level, the Pearson correlation between the average size of the funds and the 
average ownership is 0.2. The larger mutual funds in terms of assets under management 
(TNA) are domiciled in the countries that host more funds. 
Funds based outside the euro area have on average higher values under 
management (TNA), 951M€ vs. 662M€ for funds based inside the euro area, but similar 
ownership levels (0.08% vs. 0.08%). Funds based inside the euro area invest less in home 
stocks than funds based in other European countries (16% vs. 33%) and invest 
considerably more in euro area stocks, 19% vs. 15% (home stocks are also euro area 
                                                          
38 Excluding Home and German stocks; 
39 Excluding Home, Euro Area, German and UK stocks; 
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stocks, for funds based in euro area countries). When we compare the ownership levels, 
funds based within the euro area, while allocating more in euro area stocks (19%), on 
average, have lower ownership levels of companies based in the euro area (0.05% vs. 
0.07%).  
These preliminary findings show that capital allocation of mutual funds is diverse 
across countries or regions where funds are based. Further analysis is conducted in section 
4.3.1.       
 
4.2.2 Methodology 
Following the previous studies of Wojcik (2002) or Stulz (2005) we assume that 
the cross-border ownership levels are a proxy of the true levels of financial market 
integration. Two similar funds based in different countries should have similar portfolios. 
In other words, for any of those funds, the ownership level displayed for foreign stocks40 
should be close to the ownership level in similar home stocks41, if the two regions are 
financially integrated. If ownership levels are higher in home stocks, this could suggest 
any form of market segmentation, for example, the existence of formal barriers to capital 
flows.  
Yet, it is important to stress that different ownership levels for home and foreign 
stocks may not necessarily be associated with financial market integration and may 
merely reflect fund preferences given that there may be significant differences between 
domestic and foreign stocks characteristics.  
Our study is thus rather exploratory. We assess whether there are differences in 
ownership levels between domestic and foreign stocks and propose a model that helps us 
explain those differences. We use the methodology followed by Thapa et al. (2013) to 
explain the difference between domestic and foreign ownership levels. 
Our variable of interest is Ownership. For each mutual fund, we obtain the level 
of ownership for its holdings considering the market capitalization of each stock. Due to 
                                                          
40 In companies based outside the country where the investor is domiciled. 
41 In companies based in the country where the investor is domiciled. 
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the size of each mutual fund portfolio, and in order to overcome limitation in computer 
processing, we clustered the holdings by location in eleven groups, as summarized in 
Table 4.2: (i) holdings of home companies, i.e., companies based in the same country of 
the investors (Home Ownership); (ii) holdings of companies that are based inside the euro 
area except German and home stocks42 (Other Euro Area Ownership excluding Home 
and German stocks); (iii) holdings of companies based in Europe except Germany, home, 
euro area and the United Kingdom stocks (Other Europe Ownership excluding Home, 
Euro Area, Germany and UK); (iv) holdings of companies based in Germany except home 
stocks (Germany Ownership); (v) holdings of companies based in the UK except home 
stocks (UK Ownership); (vi) holdings of companies based in the US (US Stocks 
Ownership); (vii) holdings of companies based in Canada (Canada Ownership); (viii) 
holdings of companies based in America except US and Canadian stocks (Other America 
Ownership excluding US and Canada); (ix) holdings of companies based in Africa (Africa 
Ownership); (x) holdings of companies based in Japan (Japan Ownership); (xi) holdings 
of companies based in Asia except Japanese stocks (Other Asia Ownership excluding 
Japan). We compute a weighted average of the single holding ownership levels43. 
 
Ownership Clusters Description 
Home Ownership Weighted average ownership in home stocks 
Other Euro Area Ownership Weighted average ownership in other euro area stocks 
Other Europe Ownership Weighted average ownership in other European stocks 
Germany Ownership Weighted average ownership in German stocks 
UK Ownership Weighted average ownership in UK stocks 
US Ownership Weighted average ownership in US stocks 
Canada Ownership Weighted average ownership in Canadian stocks 
Other America Ownership Weighted average ownership in other American stocks 
Africa Ownership Weighted average ownership in African stocks 
Japan Ownership Weighted average ownership in Japanese stocks 
Other Asia Ownership Weighted average ownership in other Asian stocks  
Table 4.2 - Ownership Clusters Description 
 
                                                          
42 For funds based inside the euro area. 
43 We weight the ownership level using the market capitalization of the stocks. As such, large (small) cap 
companies, for which ownership levels are lower, have higher (lower) weights. 
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One important feature of this clustering is that all the eleven groups are mutually 
exclusive, meaning that one holding is only considered in one group. That assumption 
must be considered especially when analyzing the amount invested, e.g., in Europe. 
Considering that all mutual funds are based in Europe, the amount allocated in European 
stocks corresponds to the sum of the amount invested in Home, Other Euro Area, 
Germany, Other European stocks and the UK. Furthermore, for funds based in Germany 
and UK we consider all the home stock investment in Home Stocks Ownership. 
 
4.2.3 Model Specification and Variables Definition  
Our empirical model allows us to evaluate which factors influence domestic and 
foreign (Other Euro Area, Other Europe, etc.) ownership levels and to test if those levels 
are affected by the introduction of the euro and the great financial crisis. Moreover, the 
utilization of subsamples based on fund location (inside and outside the Euro area) or 
investment destination also allows us to test if and how location matters to ownership. 
Considering that the ownership level is related to the size of the fund and is 
affected by several drivers already mentioned above, we include (i) a set of variables that 
could be drivers of ownership and including a euro area investment dummy; and (ii) a 
time dummy to control for the great financial crisis. 
Given that, the specification model is given by: 
 
 𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑁𝐴)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑆𝐺𝑖𝑡𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡𝑗 +
𝛽5𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽6𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑗 + 𝛽7𝐹𝐹𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡𝑗 + 𝛽8𝐷𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑡 +
𝛽9𝐷𝐼𝐸𝑈𝑅𝑂𝑖𝑡𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                (4.1) 
 
 𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑗 is the weighted average ownership level for fund i, in period t of the 
stocks in region j. 
Portfolio size is measured by the logarithm of the total net assets (TNA) under 
management. The level of ownership is positively correlated with the TNA meaning that 
a large investor could own, in principle, a larger stake of the company. 
As mentioned in section one, the Corporate Insider Theory advances some 
important arguments that could explain the level of ownership. Previous literature such 
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as Giannetti and Simonov (2006) and Leuz et al. (2010), show that on average, foreigners 
invest less in firms with poor governance due to the lack of transparency and higher level 
of information asymmetry implying higher monitoring costs for investors. We use a 
measure of environmental, social and governance (ESG) provided by Bloomberg, 
considering a total dataset of almost 9,500 companies in 83 countries. As discussed 
before, a higher quality of Corporate Governance should minimize the risk of agency 
problems and improve the disclosure of companies increasing the attractiveness for 
foreign investors. We consider this measure for each stock in the portfolio and then the 
weighted average at a fund level. The score ranges between 0.1 and 100, where 100 refers 
to the highest level of Corporate Governance standard. 
 Besides the monitoring costs, other explicit costs and barriers for foreign 
investors were considered. As mentioned by Black (1974) or Djankov et al. (2010) or 
Mishra and Ratti (2013) one of the most relevant transaction costs are the tax differentials, 
which directly influence the investment destination. To capture this effect, we use the 
World Bank measure Paying Taxes (TAXES) provided in the Doing Business data. 
Higher score indicates that the fiscal framework has an important impact on foreign 
investment, reducing its attractiveness. Once again, it is first measured at a stock level 
and then calculated the weighted average at a fund level. So, for the cluster of home 
investment, we impose the value 0 for the TAXES variable given that there are no 
restrictions to invest in home stocks. 
We also control for different legal frameworks with direct impact on minority 
investors protection. La Porta et al. (1999) states that ownership is more dispersed in 
countries with better legal protection of minorities. So, in order to capture the minority 
protection effect, we included two explanatory variables: (i) a dummy (LEGAL) that 
takes the value 1 if the stock is based in a common law country and 0 otherwise and (ii) 
the World Bank measure protecting minority investors (PROTECTION) provided in the 
Doing Business data. Previous literature, e.g. Iushchenko (2012), demonstrates that 
countries with common law have a higher level of minority shareholders protection. So, 
it is expected that investors allocate a higher percentage of their wealth in companies 
domiciled in common law countries. The measure of protection of minority shareholders 
is provided by Djankov et al. (2008) that focuses on private enforcement mechanisms. As 
mentioned by previous literature, foreigners invest less in companies with poor outsider 
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protection so we expect a positive relation between minority protection and foreign 
ownership44.  
When there are restrictions to cross border capital movements, the ownership level 
in cross border shares is limited. Even before the introduction of the euro, one of the main 
achievements of the foundation of a European Union was the progressive removal of 
barriers to capital flows, which is a necessary condition for financial integration. We use 
a measure provided by the Economic Freedom Network (RESTRIC) that accounts for the 
capital controls in the country where the stock is based and ranges between 0 and 10, 
where 10 translates a fully open market without any kind of capital flows restrictions. So, 
for the cluster of home investment, we impose the value 10 for the RESTRIC variable 
given that there are no restrictions to invest in home stocks. 
Investors only buy non-domestic assets when they are available to trade, in the 
time and quantity desired. So, the level of free float and correspondent liquidity level are 
important drivers of ownership level. Following, e.g., Dahlquist et al. (2003) we use Free 
Float (FFLOAT), at a stock level. This data is available from Bloomberg.  
In order to estimate the effect of a potential structural event over the time frame 
analyzed, we include a dummy (DCRISIS) that takes the value of 1 if the observation is 
from the period between 2007 and 2009 and 0 otherwise (financial crisis period). 
Lastly, in order to evaluate if ownership levels are different for euro area stocks, 
we introduce a dummy (DIEURO) that takes the value 1 if the stock is based in the euro 
area and 0 otherwise.  
Table 4.3 summarizes all variables included in the model.  
  
                                                          
44 See, for example, Gelos and Wei, 2005, Stulz, 2005, Doidge et al., 2007, Kho et al., 2009, Leuz et al., 
2010. 
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Variable  Source Description 
Fund base    
Total Net Assets TNA - Log of total net assets under management 
Stock base    
Corporate Governance 
Score 
ESG Bloomberg 
Range between 0.1 (Min. Score) and 100 (Max. 
Score) 
Fiscal Score TAXES World Bank Position on ranking (Higher – worst) 
Dummy Legal LEGAL - 1 – Common Law; 0 – other wise 
Protecting minority 
investors 
PROTECTION World Bank Position on ranking (Higher – worst) 
Degree of financial 
liberalization 
RESTRIC 
Economic Freedom 
Network 
Capital control measure, 0 (closed) - 10 (fully open) 
Free Float FFLOAT Bloomberg Percentage of Free Float shares 
Time and Location base    
Dummy Crisis DCRISIS - 1 – 2007 to 2009; 0 – other wise 
Dummy Euro Area 
Investment 
DIEURO - 1 – Stock domiciled in Euro Area; 0 – other wise 
Table 4.3 - Ownership model - Variable Definition 
 
For some variables (ESG, TAXES, PROTECTION, RESTRIC, FFLOAT), data 
was only available after March 2003. For the variables PROTECTION and TAXES the 
data was from the Doing Business 2018 release. 
We estimate the model for the period from March 2003 to June 2011 with all 
explanatory variables described on Table 4.3 with 50,543 observations, pooling quarters, 
funds and investment destinations.  
 
4.3 Preliminary Results 
4.3.1 Summary Statistics – Corporate ownership of European funds 
Ownership has three different dimensions: (i) fund location; (ii) investment 
destination and (iii) time.  
 
4.3.1.1 Corporate ownership over time 
Figure 4.1 displays the weighted average corporate ownership and ownership of 
home stocks for euro area and non-euro area European funds. Ownership is relatively 
stable across the period most of the time ranging between 0.05% and 0.1%, particularly 
for euro-area funds. On average, ownership levels are higher for non-euro funds and are 
  
88 
 
more time-varying over the sample period. These changes somehow reflect changes in 
sample composition (number and type of funds) over time.  
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Figure 4.1 - Evolution of Ownership by Region, 1997-2010
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For euro area funds, home ownership levels are similar to the overall ownership 
over the entire sample period, slightly above the overall average at the beginning of the 
period and then, after 2004, slightly below the overall average. Despite that, over the 
entire period, funds based inside the euro area show a lower level of home ownership 
when compared to the level of ownership observed by funds based outside the euro area 
(in line with the results shown in Table 4.6). 
For funds based outside the euro area, we observe a downward trend in ownership 
over the period. Further, the average ownership in home stocks is in almost all periods, 
above the overall ownership level.  
In sum, preliminary results show the level of ownership is relatively stable over 
the sample period. When we restrict the analysis to home stocks, we find different patterns 
for funds based inside the euro area and for funds based in other European countries. 
 
4.3.1.2 Corporate Ownership: Investment Destination  
On average, the 834 funds included invested 25.8% in home stocks. 21.1% was 
invested in the euro area stocks (of which 4.3% in German stocks – excluding German 
funds’ investment in home stocks).   
As shown in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, the wealth allocation is heterogeneous across 
destinations, showing a pronounced home bias with more than one quarter invested in 
home stocks, followed by the investments in the euro area. Other important target 
countries are the US and Japan, with an allocation of, respectively 13.0% and 11.6% of 
TNA. Investment allocation in Europe outside the euro area (including the UK) was 
14.1%. European funds invested less in African and Canadian stocks, allocating less than 
1% of their portfolio to either of these regions.  
When we look at corporate ownership figures, discrepancies across destinations 
are smaller. While the investment in EA stocks is dominant when compared to other 
regions, average corporate ownership is 0.06% for EA stocks, below the overall average 
level of 0.08%. This difference could be driven by many factors, such as the size and the 
number of companies funds are investing in or the investors’ preferences or investment 
limitations due to fund investment policy. In our model, we try to handle it by using the 
weighted average ownership in stocks and including as independent variables the mains 
drivers of corporate ownership presented by previous literature.  
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Funds based in the euro area show a rather constant level of corporate ownership 
across destinations but close to 60% of their wealth is allocated to European stocks. Funds 
based in other European countries show a slight lower preference for stocks based outside 
Europe yet there is a higher level of ownership in these regions.   
Funds based in countries inside the euro area invest less in home stocks than funds 
based in countries outside the euro area (16% vs. 33%) and more in euro area stocks (19% 
vs. 15%). Yet, the “euro bias” is not translated into higher average ownership levels. 
Despite the difference between the wealth allocated to home and euro area stocks, 
especially for funds based outside the euro area, the average ownership level is fairly 
similar in both cases (difference of 3 basis points for home stocks and basis point for euro 
area stocks).  
The larger home bias for funds based outside the euro area is driven by the 
behavior of investors based in the UK that allocate more than 30% in home stocks. This 
could be explained by the development of the UK stock market and high number of 
listings therein (that are not only listings of UK companies). For euro area funds, the 
results are driven particularly by the behavior of German investors, who allocate only 
16% of their wealth to home stocks. Despite this large difference, the average corporate 
ownership level in home stocks is only 0.2 percentage points higher for UK investors than 
for other non-euro area investors. 
As referred before, the number of stocks invested could explain why there is no 
correspondence between the investment amounts allocated and the ownership level45. 
That apparent preference for smaller stakes in several companies instead of controlling 
only one, which La Porta et al. (1999) associates to institutional investors, could stem 
from expropriation risk. Investors that worship the protection of their investments are 
more attentive to the legal system, minority rights protection and the rule of law. 
The lack of connection between the amounts allocated and ownership levels 
occurs also for the case of Japanese stocks. Funds based in the euro area invest more 10 
percentage points than non-euro area funds in Japan (17.5% vs 7.1%) but the ownership 
level is similar for all euro and non-euro area funds (0.04%). The higher preference for 
Japanese stocks is driven by the behavior of funds based in Germany and Ireland.  
                                                          
45 The average size of the companies in each market also impacts the level of ownership achieved. 
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With regard to fund location, the discrepancies between investors are more 
prominent for home and euro area stocks. For home stocks, for example, Greek investors 
allocate almost 80% of their wealth and in the other extreme, Irish investors allocate only 
1.6% of their portfolios to home stocks. Yet, the gap on average ownership level for home 
stocks is only of 0.02 percentage points. For euro area stocks, excluding home stocks for 
funds based inside the euro area, we find that Belgian investors allocate 36% of their 
wealth to stocks of companies in the euro area while Greek investors allocate only 5.5%. 
Yet, Greek investors show a higher level of ownership (0.09%) in the euro area stocks 
than Belgian investors (0.04%).  
There are few cases where ownership levels are rather different from the global 
average. Belgian investors have an average ownership of 0.04% but for UK and Asia 
(excluding Japan) stocks display an average ownership around 0.30%. German investors 
also show a similar deviation in US stocks with an average ownership of 0.15%, 
compared to an overall ownership level of 0.07%. These results may be driven by the fact 
that funds select only a small number of companies to invest. 
Overall, we find that the funds in our sample show very different patterns of 
investment depending on their location and also have different ownership levels across 
all investment destinations.  
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 PANEL A 
EA 
(455) 
NEA 
(379) 
Total 
(834) 
%Home Investment 16.3% 33.0% 25.8% 
%Euro Area Investment 19.0% 15.2% 16.8% 
%Europe Investment 7.4% 7.7% 7.6% 
%Germany Investment 2.9% 5.4% 4.3% 
%UK Investment 11.4% 2.8% 6.5% 
%US Investment 13.0% 13.0% 13.0% 
%Canada Investment 0.9% 0.8% 0.8% 
%America Investment 3.8% 4.4% 4.1% 
%Africa Investment 0.2% 0.6% 0.4% 
%Japan Investment 17.5% 7.1% 11.6% 
%Asia Investment 7.7% 9.9% 9.0% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 
    
 PANEL B 
Austria 
(44) 
Belgium 
(26) 
Denmark 
(41) 
UK 
(282) 
Finland 
(40) 
France 
(30) 
Germany 
(107) 
Greece 
(32) 
Ireland 
(34) 
%Home Investment 4.5% 6.5% 9.8% 32.8% 46.7% 35.3% 16.4% 76.9% 1.6% 
%Euro Area Investment 22.4% 36.0% 13.1% 16.3% 11.7% 14.8% 18.4% 5.5% 23.9% 
%Europe Investment 14.1% 7.9% 12.1% 7.7% 9.9% 6.7% 6.9% 3.5% 7.0% 
%Germany Investment 7.4% 11.0% 6.1% 6.1% 4.4% 7.9% 0.0% 1.1% 6.4% 
%UK Investment 14.1% 15.8% 10.4% 0.0% 8.5% 10.1% 10.5% 2.1% 17.5% 
%US Investment 7.2% 19.1% 16.0% 11.2% 6.6% 12.8% 11.8% 5.5% 10.2% 
%Canada Investment 0.6% 0.3% 0.6% 0.7% 0.2% 1.9% 1.0% 0.0% 0.3% 
%America Investment 1.1% 0.2% 9.9% 5.2% 3.5% 3.5% 2.8% 0.0% 0.7% 
%Africa Investment 0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 0.7% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.4% 0.2% 
%Japan Investment 1.0% 1.8% 4.7% 8.4% 0.5% 3.3% 25.4% 1.2% 23.0% 
%Asia Investment 27.4% 1.4% 17.2% 10.7% 7.9% 3.6% 6.8% 3.9% 9.0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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 PANEL B (cont.) 
Italy 
(20) 
Luxembourg 
(25) 
Netherlands 
(39) 
Portugal 
(26) 
Spain 
(32) 
Sweden 
(51) 
Switzerland 
(5) 
%Home Investment 16.0% 3.4% 9.7% 2.4% 32.5% 41.4% 3.2% 
%Euro Area Investment 16.5% 22.7% 16.0% 24.0% 27.8% 11.8% 14.5% 
%Europe Investment 19.2% 9.8% 6.5% 4.6% 6.0% 7.1% 2.3% 
%Germany Investment 6.3% 7.9% 4.9% 7.8% 10.0% 2.7% 5.6% 
%UK Investment 12.8% 13.0% 10.9% 16.3% 11.5% 7.2% 55.8% 
%US Investment 14.8% 27.9% 19.9% 9.5% 9.7% 19.6% 1.4% 
%Canada Investment 1.2% 0.6% 0.9% 2.4% 1.0% 0.8% 0.2% 
%America Investment 0.1% 0.3% 13.7% 20.0% 0.2% 0.6% 3.3% 
%Africa Investment 0.4% 0.1% 0.7% 0.6% 0.1% 0.1% 1.1% 
%Japan Investment 4.9% 6.5% 3.7% 5.8% 0.6% 3.5% 0.4% 
%Asia Investment 7.8% 7.9% 13.1% 6.4% 0.6% 5.1% 12.2% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Table 4.4 - Amount allocated by Domicile and Region – Average for the period between June 1997 and June 2011 for 834 funds 
Figures in parentheses are the number of funds. 
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 PANEL A 
EA 
(455) 
NEA 
(379) 
Total 
(834) 
Home Ownership 0.08% 0.11% 0.10% 
Euro Area Ownership 0.05% 0.07% 0.06% 
Europe Ownership 0.05% 0.07% 0.06% 
Germany Ownership 0.02% 0.05% 0.04% 
UK Ownership 0.09% 0.02% 0.05% 
US Ownership 0.11% 0.08% 0.10% 
Canada Ownership 0.05% 0.11% 0.08% 
America Ownership 0.05% 0.04% 0.05% 
Africa Ownership 0.01% 0.05% 0.04% 
Japan Ownership 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 
Asia Ownership 0.06% 0.09% 0.08% 
Ownership 0.08% 0.08% 0.08% 
    
 PANEL B 
Austria 
(44) 
Belgium 
(26) 
Denmark 
(41) 
UK 
(282) 
Finland 
(40) 
France 
(30) 
Germany 
(107) 
Greece 
(32) 
Ireland 
(34) 
Home Ownership 0.05% 0.07% 0.07% 0.09% 0.08% 0.10% 0.07% 0.10% 0.08% 
Euro Area Ownership 0.06% 0.07% 0.04% 0.07% 0.03% 0.10% 0.05% 0.09% 0.04% 
Europe Ownership 0.04% 0.03% 0.13% 0.07% 0.05% 0.08% 0.05% 0.02% 0.04% 
Germany Ownership 0.05% 0.03% 0.05% 0.05% 0.02% 0.07% - 0.01% 0.05% 
UK Ownership 0.07% 0.30% 0.07% - 0.05% 0.08% 0.08% 0.06% 0.05% 
US Ownership 0.04% 0.06% 0.06% 0.08% 0.02% 0.14% 0.15% 0.13% 0.04% 
Canada Ownership 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 0.13% 0.01% 0.09% 0.04% 0.00% 0.01% 
America Ownership 0.00% 0.01% 0.04% 0.05% 0.02% 0.17% 0.02% 0.00% 0.01% 
Africa Ownership 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.05% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 
Japan Ownership 0.00% 0.01% 0.04% 0.05% 0.00% 0.06% 0.04% 0.02% 0.03% 
Asia Ownership 0.04% 0.29% 0.06% 0.10% 0.04% 0.07% 0.05% 0.03% 0.03% 
Ownership 0.05% 0.04% 0.06% 0.09% 0.07% 0.12% 0.07% 0.09% 0.06% 
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 PANEL B (cont) 
Italy 
(20) 
Luxembourg 
(25) 
Netherlands 
(39) 
Portugal 
(26) 
Spain 
(32) 
Sweden 
(51) 
Switzerland 
(5) 
Home Ownership 0.02% 0.02% 0.13% 0.02% 0.05% 0.22% 0.04% 
Euro Area Ownership 0.02% 0.03% 0.06% 0.08% 0.03% 0.06% 0.08% 
Europe Ownership 0.05% 0.06% 0.05% 0.12% 0.04% 0.05% 0.08% 
Germany Ownership 0.02% 0.05% 0.05% 0.19% 0.05% 0.06% 0.02% 
UK Ownership 0.02% 0.03% 0.13% 0.18% 0.05% 0.06% 0.09% 
US Ownership 0.04% 0.04% 0.05% 0.06% 0.03% 0.09% 0.09% 
Canada Ownership 0.02% 0.01% 0.10% 0.03% 0.00% 0.05% 0.03% 
America Ownership 0.00% 0.02% 0.20% 0.02% 0.01% 0.02% 0.04% 
Africa Ownership 0.02% 0.01% 0.05% 0.00% 0.00% 0.08% 0.08% 
Japan Ownership 0.02% 0.03% 0.03% 0.00% 0.04% 0.03% 0.01% 
Asia Ownership 0.02% 0.03% 0.06% 0.04% 0.01% 0.07% 0.09% 
Ownership 0.04% 0.04% 0.11% 0.09% 0.03% 0.07% 0.08% 
 
Table 4.5 - Ownership by Domicile and Region – Average for the period between June 1997 and June 2011 for 834 funds 
Figures in parentheses are the number of funds. 
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To test if fund location impacts ownership, we perform a t-test of differences in 
means between funds based in the euro area countries and funds based in other European 
countries. Table 4.6 shows the results which indicate that we reject the null that the 
difference in means is zero, at the 1% level, for all variables. 
 
Clusters Groups 
Mean 
Difference 
p-value 
Ownership (all stocks) Euro Area vs. Non Euro Area funds -0.01% 0.000 
Home Ownership Euro Area vs. Non Euro Area funds -0.03% 0.000 
Non-Home Ownership Euro Area vs. Non Euro Area funds -0.08% 0.000 
Euro Area Ownership46 Euro Area vs. Non Euro Area funds -0.01% 0.000 
Non-Euro Area Ownership Euro Area vs. Non Euro Area funds -0.09% 0.000 
Table 4.6 - Ownership Differences between Euro area and non-Euro area funds 
 
The results show higher ownership levels for funds based outside the euro area 
which in part stems from the fact that these funds have higher TNAs. The gap is specially 
noticed in the investment of non-euro area stocks.  
In order to understand if fund size (measured by the total net assets – TNA – that 
is the value under management) determines the ownership level, we split our dataset by 
fund size (TNA below or above the median). Table 4.7 shows that, as expected, the 
weighted average total ownership for funds with TNA above the median is 0.03 
percentage points higher. 
 
  
Mean 
[Weighted 
Average] 
Median 
[Weighted 
Average] 
Std. 
Deviation 
Funds w/TNA below Median 0.05% 0.03% 0.06% 
Funds w/TNA above Median 0.08% 0.06% 0.08% 
Total 0.08% 0.05% 0.08% 
Table 4.7 - Ownership split by TNA 
 
For home stocks investment, the difference in corporate ownership between larger 
and smaller funds is 0.05 percentage points, as shown in Table 4.8.  
These figures suggest ownership levels are, as expected, limited by fund size. In 
fact, for smaller funds, we show similar averages of total ownership and average 
                                                          
46 Weighted average ownership including German stocks. 
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ownership in domestic assets (0.05%). This was already shown in Table 4.1, where funds 
based inside the euro area, which have a lower average TNA (662M for euro area funds 
vs. 951M for funds based within other European countries), have lower home ownership.   
 
  
Mean 
[Weighted 
Average] 
Median 
[Weighted 
Average] 
Std. 
Deviation 
Funds w/TNA below Median 0.05% 0.02% 0.07% 
Funds w/TNA above Median 0.10% 0.06% 0.11% 
Total 0.10% 0.06% 0.11% 
Table 4.8 - Home Stocks Ownership split by TNA 
 
Lastly, as far as the euro area stocks are concerned, we notice that fund size does 
not seem to be a relevant driver of the levels of ownership. Table 4.9 shows the test results.   
 
  
Mean 
[Weighted 
Average] 
Median 
[Weighted 
Average] 
Std. 
Deviation 
Funds w/TNA below Median 0.06% 0.02% 0.73% 
Funds w/TNA above Median 0.06% 0.04% 0.11% 
Total 0.06% 0.04% 0.25% 
Table 4.9 - Euro Area Stocks Ownership split by TNA 
 
These results are consistent with the figures in Table 4.6: while euro area funds 
display euro bias, differences in corporate ownership of euro area stocks between funds 
based inside and outside the euro area (larger funds) are not significant.   
 
 
4.3.2 Summary Statistics – Explanatory Variables 
 
Table 4.10 presents the main statistics of the explanatory variables considered in 
the ownership level model.  
The European mutual funds in our sample show, on average, investment 
preferences for stocks associated with high quality of corporate governance and good 
protection of minority shareholders but there is some variation across funds. Additionally, 
as expected, funds invest in stocks located in countries that do not have barriers as 
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suggested by the high level of the RESTRIC variable. The level of FFLOAT also reflects 
that investors invest more in companies that are not controlled by one major shareholder. 
  
 
Variables Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Std. 
Deviation 
LOG(TNA) 2.71 2.76 -0.04 4.65 0.52 
ESG 46.34 48.57 0.28 66.96 8.56 
TAXES 37.86 36.00 0.00 184.00 33.07 
LEGAL 0.29 0.04 0.00 1.00 0.43 
PROTECTION 48.15 44.26 0.01 146.00 25.18 
RESTRIC 7.92 7.69 0.00 10.00 1.06 
FFLOAT 68.42 72.37 0.01 100.00 19.05 
Table 4.10 - Summary Statistics for Explanatory Variables – Average for the period between March 2003 
and June 2011 
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4.3.3 Correlation 
Table 4.11 shows the correlation matrix between the independent variables included in the model.  
 LOG(TNA) ESG TAXES LEGAL PROTECTION RESTRIC FFLOAT DCRISIS DIEURO 
LOG(TNA) 1         
ESG -0.08 1        
TAXES 0.08 -0.27 1       
LEGAL 0.06 0.41 -0.27 1      
PROTECTION 0.01 -0.31 0.20 -0.62 1     
RESTRIC -0.06 0.24 -0.62 0.19 -0.12 1    
FFLOAT -0.01 0.46 -0.32 0.48 -0.19 0.34 1   
DCRISIS 0.05 -0.09 0.01 0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.07 1  
DIEURO 0.00 0.15 0.10 -0.12 0.08 -0.22 -0.34 0.00 1 
Table 4.11 - Correlation between Variables – Average for the period between March 2003 and June 2011 
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There are two cases where the correlation coefficient between the two variables is 
above 0.5: the correlation between the limitation of cross border flows (RESTRIC) and 
taxes and the correlation between protection variable and the legal system variable. 
 The correlation between the protection variable and the legal system variable 
shows the expected result, given that common law systems are expected to be more 
efficient in the protection of minority investors. 
In the two additional cases with correlation coefficient above 0.45, we find another 
expected result, the correlation between corporate governance score and free float. The 
presence of an insider shareholder tends to increase the risk of agency problems, reducing 
the corporate governance score. Given that common law systems are more protective for 
minority investors, a positive correlation between legal system and free float is therefore 
in line with the expected results.  
We address the concerns of multicollinearity later on by conducting some 
robustness tests.  
 
4.4 Empirical Results and Analysis 
 
This section shows our main empirical results. We used EGLS panel regression 
estimation technique with cross-section (mutual funds) weights47. Ownership regression 
results are presented for the full sample and for the two subsamples: funds based in 
countries inside the euro area (EA) and funds based in other European countries (NEA). 
Comparing the results of the two subsamples is informative, to find out if there are 
relevant differences between funds based in countries inside and outside the euro area.  
 
4.4.1 Ownership Model – Full Sample and Euro and Non Euro Area Funds  
Table 4.12 illustrates the results for the Ownership variable.  
                                                          
47 EGLS application with mutual funds weights is supported by the result of the Hausman test which 
shows that random effects should not be used. 
  
102 
 
 Ownership Ownership Ownership 
 2003-2011 2003-2011 2003-2011 
 Total EA NEA 
Intercept 0.0328*** -0.0052** 0.1625*** 
LOG(TNA) 0.0157*** 0.0073*** 0.0414*** 
ESG -0.0000 -0.0001*** 0.0002*** 
TAXES 0.0000 0.0002*** -0.0003*** 
LEGAL 0.0314*** 0.0230*** 0.0211*** 
PROTECTION -0.0004*** -0.0002*** -0.0006*** 
RESTRIC -0.0022*** 0.0049*** -0.0290*** 
FFLOAT 0.0003*** 0.0001*** 0.0008*** 
DCRISIS 0.0014*** 0.0082*** 0.0033*** 
DIEURO 0.0004 0.0082*** -0.0305*** 
    
Adjusted R-squared 54.84% 17.06% 88.72% 
Observations 50,543 23,540 27,003 
  ***significant at 1% level 
  **significant at 5% level 
  *significant at 10% level 
Table 4.12 - Total Ownership – Regression estimates  
 
In general, the results show a reasonable quality of adjustment and most of the 
estimated parameters are significant at the 1% level.  
In line with the preliminary tests performed in section 4.3.1.2, the ownership is 
positively related to portfolio size.  
The severeness of capital controls (RESTRIC) seems to have mixed effects on the 
level of corporate ownership. The effect is not clear especially when we split the sample 
between funds based inside the euro area and in other European countries. The average 
ownership level is lower when barriers are smaller which may eventually indicate an 
opportunity to enhance the level of portfolio diversification, through the investment in 
more stocks.  
As far as the Corporate Insider Theory is concerned, we also have mixed results. 
As expected, funds have higher ownership levels in stocks with higher Free Float and of 
companies located in countries where minority investors’ protection is higher and with 
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common law systems. However, the estimated parameter associated with the proxy of 
Corporate Governance (ESG) has the opposite sign, but it is not statistically significant. 
Results are more informative when we split our dataset in two subsamples; funds 
based within the euro area and funds based in other European countries.  
Funds based outside the euro area show an opposite reaction (when compared to 
the ones bases inside) to corporate governance score and capital controls, with high 
ownership in stocks with higher corporate governance scores, as expected. However, 
contrarily to expectations ownerships is positively associated with barriers to capital flow.    
Results suggest that the financial crisis led to a slightly average increase of 
ownership levels but this parameter is not significant for funds based outside the euro 
area. Davydoff et al. (2013) also refers that financial crises did not impose a material 
change on ownership structure. 
Our figures also show that ownership is higher in euro area stocks for funds based 
in the euro area. 
Overall, after controlling for the main drivers of ownership, provided by previous 
literature, we understand that location matters as shown by the different results obtained 
when we split our sample. We find different reactions to many of the drivers discussed 
before which may translate different preferences but also suggest imperfect integration 
between the markets.  
 
4.4.1.1 Excluding Home Stocks 
As shown in Table 4.4 funds allocate a relevant wealth in home stocks. Those 
stocks are the most relevant in the holdings weighting more than 25% on average and are 
even more important for investors based outside the euro, more than 30%. 
Table 4.13 illustrates the results for the Ownership variable for a subsample of 
observations, excluding Home Stocks.  
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Ownership 
w/o Home 
Stocks 
Ownership 
w/o Home 
Stocks 
Ownership 
w/o Home 
Stocks 
 2003-2011 2003-2011 2003-2011 
 Total EA NEA 
Intercept -0.0193*** -0.0108*** 0.1350*** 
LOG(TNA) 0.0136*** 0.0072*** 0.0181*** 
ESG 0.0001*** -0.0004*** 0.0001*** 
TAXES 0.0002*** 0.0003*** -0.0002*** 
LEGAL 0.0626*** 0.0299*** 0.0336*** 
PROTECTION -0.0004*** -0.0001*** -0.0006*** 
RESTRIC 0.0071*** 0.0075*** -0.0134*** 
FFLOAT -0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0002*** 
DCRISIS 0.0067*** 0.0055*** 0.0037*** 
DIEURO -0.0075*** 0.0076*** -0.0246*** 
    
Adjusted R-squared 73.22% 27.89% 37.39% 
Observations 43,288 20,153 23,135 
  ***significant at 1% level 
  **significant at 5% level 
  *significant at 10% level 
Table 4.13 - Total Ownership - subsample without Home Stocks  
 
In general, we find similar results to the ones for the full sample. Yet, there are a 
few differences that are worth to highlight.  
When investing abroad, funds seem to react differently to the level of free float. 
As expected, results in the section 4.4.1 show that funds increase their average ownership 
level if the assets are available to trade, in the time and quantity desired. Additionally, a 
higher level of free float could be associated to less agency problems When we exclude 
home stocks, surprisingly, higher ownership is now associated with lower free float. 
In regard to the parameter associated with Corporate Governance Score (ESG), 
the estimate has now the expected sign. When investing abroad, the average level of 
ownership increases in stocks with better corporate governance scores.  
In section 4.4.1, lower barriers were associated with lower average ownership, 
contrarily to what was expected. We now observe that, when we exclude home stocks, 
lower capital controls are associated with higher levels of ownership, as expected.  
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4.4.2 Ownership in Euro area stocks 
Our previous tests show how investors’ location influences corporate ownership. 
To evaluate whether ownership decisions of euro area stocks are driven by similar factors, 
we compare the regression results for euro area and non-euro area funds in regard to their 
ownership of euro area stocks. We build two subsamples of euro area holdings by funds 
domiciled inside the euro area (“domestic” funds) and funds domiciled in other European 
countries (“foreign” funds). Table 4.14 shows the results.  
 
 Euro Area Stocks Ownership 
 2003-2011 2003-2011 
 EA (“domestic” funds) NEA (“foreign” funds) 
Intercept 0.4192*** -0.0305 
LOG(TNA) -0.0277*** 0.0373*** 
ESG -0.0014*** 0.0003*** 
TAXES -0.0011*** -0.0006*** 
LEGAL -0.0200*** 0.0422*** 
PROTECTION 0.0011*** 0.0004*** 
RESTRIC -0.0380*** -0.0033 
FFLOAT 0.0010*** -0.0003*** 
DCRISIS 0.0033 -0.0013** 
   
Adjusted R-squared 53.28% 46.22% 
Observations 4,505 4,365 
  ***significant at 1% level 
  **significant at 5% level 
  *significant at 10% level 
Table 4.14 - Euro Area Stocks Ownership  
 
Overall, the results show a reasonable quality of adjustment along with a good 
level of significance for most of the variables included in the model.  
Yet the drivers of ownership for “domestic” and “foreign” investors are not alike 
and parameter estimates are not consistent. The difference could be informative if we 
assume that in a perfect scenario of integration euro area funds and foreign funds should 
be affected by the same factors. Moreover, as discussed above, corporate insider theory 
  
106 
 
would suggest that institutional investors should react similarly to proxies of corporate 
governance quality, regardless of their location.  
The first unexpected result is the different impact of the fund size. Large euro area 
funds do not seem to favor large ownership in euro area stocks while foreign investors 
seem to prefer to hold higher stakes of the euro area companies.  
Results also suggest that funds are differently affected by corporate governance 
scores, legal system, and free float. As expected, and particularly, in the case of foreign 
investors that face higher monitoring costs, they seem to choose to invest in countries 
where their rights are more protected. In fact, we observe higher level of ownership in 
stocks based in common law regimes and with higher corporate governance scores. The 
responsiveness to free float is however against the expected results. Foreign investors’ 
ownership is higher in stocks with low free float. On the other hand, euro area funds 
corporate ownership is positively associated with protection and free float but negatively 
related with corporate governance scores.  
Finally, the results suggest that the impact of the financial crisis did not impact 
the corporate ownership decisions of euro area funds but reduced the level of ownership 
for other foreign funds.  
So, overall the differences between the two groups show that the determinants of 
ownership of euro area stocks are not completely shared by the two groups. This result 
suggests that markets are not fully integrated.  
 
4.4.3 Robustness Tests 
We perform some additional tests to assess the robustness of the empirical results 
presented above.     
Our sample is balanced between funds based inside the euro area (56%) and funds 
based in other European countries (44%). However, most of the funds based in other 
European countries are based in the UK (and represent one third of the total sample). We 
rerun all models excluding all funds based in the UK to find out if the results were not 
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driven by the behavior of this subset of funds. The results, available upon request, hold 
when we exclude UK funds. 
Given that, due to data limitations, we assumed that PROTECT (Protecting 
minority investors) was constant through the entire sample period. The estimates for the 
remaining explanatory variables, when we drop this variable, are robust.  
Regarding the variables related to the Corporate Insider Theory, as shown in the 
previous section, the estimates for Corporate Governance Score (ESG) are unexpected 
and contradict the ones obtained for minority investors’ protection, legal system and free 
float. So, in order to test if this variable could bias the results, we run alternative 
specifications of the model excluding ESG and/or PROTECT. The results, available upon 
request, show that the main conclusions persist and are not significantly affected by 
removing or adding those variables in the model. 
Lastly, we run our model excluding, one by one, LEGAL, FFLOAT and TAXES to 
overcome potential multicollinearity issues. The results, available upon request, show that 
overall the results are similar to the base model specification.  
 
4.5 Summary and Main Conclusions 
This chapter proposes a new and explanatory approach to better understand the 
evolution of financial market integration. While preferences play an important role in 
investment allocation and corporate ownership levels, cross-border corporate ownership 
levels may also reflect the degree of financial market integration. We analyze the 
quarterly holdings of a large set of European investment funds, comparing euro area and 
non-euro area funds, and evaluate the role of corporate insider holding implications and 
other controls to explain the time series and cross-sectional variability of corporate 
ownership levels.  
The empirical specification we propose includes two different sets of variables: 
(i) arguments that have been put forward by previous literature that explain corporate 
ownership and (ii) a set of dummies to control for the impact of the recent financial crisis 
and for euro area investments. 
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Our findings show that, as expected, there is a direct correlation between the size 
of the portfolio and corporate ownership level.  
We first document that there is no correspondence between the relative amounts 
invested and the ownership level in one particular region. While investors based inside 
the euro area heavily invest in euro area assets (including home assets), more than non-
euro area funds, the level of corporate ownership in euro area stocks is similar for the two 
groups of funds. 
Overall, we find that the results are aligned with the implications of corporate 
insider theory, but there are some inconsistent results when we run the same specification 
for subsamples of euro area and non-euro area funds and subsamples of holdings. In our 
base model, ownership is positively associated with free float, with stocks based in 
common law countries and better protection of minority shareholders. Yet the impact of 
Corporate Governance Scores (ESG) is negative for the full sample and subsamples of 
euro area and non-euro area funds, when we exclude the holdings of home stocks, we get 
the right sign for the ESG parameter but the estimates for the other variables are not 
always consistent with the expected results. 
Overall results are mixed and, even if we observe that the determinants of 
corporate ownership are not the same for euro area and non-euro area funds, it is difficult 
to draw clear conclusions with regard to financial market integration. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
This study presents a multi approach analysis to financial market integration in 
Europe over the last two decades.  
The main purpose of this research is to provide further evidence on the level and 
drivers of financial integration since the euro introduction and how the process has been 
impacted by the recent financial crisis. We focus on the information conveyed by the 
portfolio returns and the holdings of investment funds. 
ICAPM, under perfect financial market integration, dictates that optimal 
allocation is achieved holding the world market portfolio. In other words, deviations from 
the world market portfolio could thus reflect that markets are not fully integrated.  
We contribute to the literature by providing a thorough study institutional 
investors’ portfolios, employing both return-based and holdings-based approaches to 
evaluate financial integration over time and across countries. In particular we propose a 
novel return-based approach to measure financial market integration; we evaluate how 
home and cross-border holdings and corporate ownership have changed in recent years 
and across investment funds based in different European countries; and we study and test 
the implications of home bias and corporate insider theory for financial market 
integration.    
Our multi approach analysis allows us to propose simple and easier ways to better 
understand and measure financial market integration. In our return-based approach we 
present a new specification model based on a very well adopted model initially proposed 
by Sharpe (1992), in which we replace the original assets classes for geographic 
benchmarks. The advantages of our model are the easiest application, less data or 
computational requirements and more important, the fact that it has proved to be robust.  
The main insights from the evidence we present in this thesis are: 
1. The level of financial integration is higher inside the euro area than in other 
European countries; 
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2. The euro introduction was followed by an intensification of the financial 
market integration that led to a portfolio reallocation by euro area 
investors, that have shifted a significant part of their holdings from 
domestic (home bias) to euro area stocks (euro bias); 
3. Our results are consistent with the phenomenon of local bias described by 
previous literature, indicating that euro area investors, with the increase of 
the financial market integration, seem to behave as euro area investors;   
4. Inside the euro area, there are different levels of integration with investors 
based in countries more affected by the financial crisis, such as Portugal, 
Italy, Greece and Spain, showing a higher preference for domestic stocks; 
5. The impact of the last financial crisis is not so clear but some adjustments 
in the portfolio allocation are noticed pointing to a setback on the level of 
financial market integration previously achieved;  
6. At the industry level, after the outbreak of the financial crisis there was 
shift from financial to energy or health care stocks;  
7. Additionally, investors based outside the euro area show an over 
preference for non-tradable industries which along with a higher level of 
home bias, suggest a lower level of financial integration;   
8. Average corporate ownership levels were relatively stable over recent 
times in most European countries; yet the determinants of corporate 
ownership are not always the same for euro area and non-euro area funds. 
The analysis we conduct has several shortcomings. The most relevant has to do 
with data limitations. More data for the period prior to the introduction of the euro would 
be very helpful to better assess the euro introduction impact and to capture all the relevant 
portfolio shifts. It is likely that portfolio allocation occurred well in advance the 
introduction of the euro. The euro introduction was a long process, formally established 
by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. So, since that our earliest available data is from June 
1997, any adjustments before that are not captured. Other potential data limitation is the 
utilization of datasets that are dependent from institutional investors contributions and do 
not result from direct data collection from an independent entity. In periods of worse 
performance, investors could be tempted to avoid to correctly disclose their positions, 
leading to data missing points or even worse data repetition. Lastly, some proxies used to 
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capture the drivers presented by Corporate Insider Theory were recently created meaning 
some limitations on historical data.      
Moreover, our sample period does not cover the end of the great financial crisis 
and it is very likely that several ongoing processes in Europe and in the Euro area, such 
the banking union, the merge trend in negotiation platforms (NYSE, Euronext and 
Deutsche Börse), the independent movements such as Brexit or the declaration of the 
independence in Catalonia, are influencing financial integration. Therefore, future work, 
as soon as data is available, is necessary to reassess the level of integration in recent years 
and how those ongoing processes impacted the already segmented markets, especially 
inside the euro area.  
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